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Abstract
We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies
by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas can be acquired by private investment or
via social learning. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual
property, and openness, which facilitates social learning. These decisions determine inter-
action rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities
in a resulting learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative
externalities on other firms, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show
that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense
networks. A corollary is that at equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction domi-
nates: the innovation rate and even average firm profits would be dramatically higher if the
network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the
critical threshold—but equilibrium remains critical even after natural interventions. One
policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who
do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation
equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of empirical research suggests that interactions between inventors are an
important part of innovation.1 New technologies are often produced by combining individual
insights with learning from peers.2 This confers benefits on firms and inventors engaged in
such learning. When highly-connected clusters of firms emerge in a location, as in the
technology industry in Silicon Valley, inventors in these areas are much more productive.
But frequent collaboration and learning are not assured even when inventors in a given
industry co-locate (Saxenian, 1996).
Rather, interaction patterns depend on firms’ endogenous decisions about how much to
collaborate with each other. More collaborative firms are better positioned to learn from
other firms and inventors. But there are also downsides to openness, as secrecy allows
firms to prevent potential competition by protecting intellectual property. This presents a
choice for firms and inventors between openness and secrecy. This paper uses network-theory
techniques to study firms’ decisions about how much to interact and their consequences for
information flows, the rate of innovation, and related policy decisions.
To do so, we use a framework inspired by recombinant growth (Weitzman, 1998) to
explicitly model the creation of new technologies. Technologies are modeled as finite sets
of distinct ideas. Ideas can be acquired in two ways: (1) via private investment and (2)
via social learning. Firms generate profits by combining ideas to produce new technologies,
but the profits from a technology are erased by competition if another firm also knows the
component ideas in that technology. There are a large number of firms, and each chooses
how much to invest in R&D as well as how open to be. Their choices of levels of openness
determine interaction rates between firms, and the probability that one firm learns from
another is equal to the interaction rate between the two firms. If a given firm is more open,
that firm is more likely to learn from others but also more exposed to others learning its
ideas.
1The benefits to interactions between inventors and movement of inventors have been quantified empiri-
cally by Akcigit, Caicedo, Miguelez, Stantcheva, and Sterzi (2018), Kerr (2008), Samila and Sorenson (2011),
among others.
2See Bessen and Nuvolari (2016) for historical examples and Chesbrough (2003) for examples in the
technology industry.
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Our first contribution, which is methodological, is to develop a theory of endogenous
formation of random networks in the context of our economic application. Learning op-
portunities are random events, and their realizations determine a learning network. We
therefore consider link formation decisions with uncertainty, while the leading approach in
the literature on network-formation games focuses on deterministic models (Jackson and
Wolinsky, 1996 and Bala and Goyal, 2000). Since we take actions to be continuous choices
that translate to interaction rates, optimal behavior satisfies first-order conditions rather
than a high-dimensional system of combinatorial inequalities.
A key feature of our model is that ideas can spread several steps through this network:
when one firm learns from another, the information transferred can include ideas learned from
a third firm. We refer to this as indirect learning. By contrast, existing work on strategic
formation of random networks largely focuses on direct connections (Currarini, Jackson, and
Pin, 2009).3 Under indirect learning, firms’ incentives depend on the global structure of the
network. Firms would like to learn many ideas, since then the firm can combine these ideas
to produce a large number of new technologies, and much of this learning can be indirect.
This analysis leads to our second contribution, which is to characterize equilibrium and
quantify the associated externalities. Learning outcomes depend dramatically on whether
the learning network is sparsely connected or densely connected. If firms’ interaction rates
are below a critical threshold, the learning network consists of many small clusters of firms
who learn few ideas. Above the threshold, the learning network has a giant component
asymptotically: a large group of firms learning a large number of ideas and thus producing
many new technologies. We analyze an individual firm’s decision problem in each of these
two domains, i.e. when other firms form a sparse or dense network.
In our baseline model, we show that the equilibrium outcome is at the critical threshold
between sparse and dense networks. Firms deviate to interact more if the network is likely
to be sparse and deviate to interact less if the network will be dense. Intuitively, in sparse
networks, firms seek to fill ‘structural holes’ by combining ideas learned via different inter-
actions (Burt, 1992). As others interact more, these structural holes disappear, and indeed
3Golub and Livne (2010) go a step further, allowing payoffs to depend on distance one and two connections.
An important feature of our model is that firms’ decisions depend on the global network structure rather
than only local connections.
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firms tend to learn the same ideas repeatedly from different interactions. So the incentives
to be more open are weaker relative to the incentives to be secretive.
When equilibrium is at the critical threshold, there are unboundedly large profitability
and welfare gains (as the number of firms grows large) from increasing interaction rates
above equilibrium levels. To rephrase in terms of the underlying economic forces, the ben-
efits from more learning outweigh the lost profits from additional competition, even if only
producers’ interests are considered. A consequence is that increasing interaction rates is a
first-order concern in designing policy. By contrast, policies targeting decisions about pri-
vate investment rather than interaction, such as subsidies to R&D, have minimal effect at
equilibrium—but can be valuable if paired with interventions to increase openness.
We discuss one policy change that can induce more productive interaction patterns,
which is to introduce public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. For
example, governments could fund academic researchers who are especially willing to interact
with other researchers, including in industry. The key is that public innovators can serve as
informational intermediaries, transmitting ideas between private firms. Thus high-innovation
clusters form around the public innovators.
We next show that the prediction of critical equilibrium does not depend on several styl-
ized assumptions in the baseline model. One such assumption is that learning probabilities
that are symmetric across pairs of firms. We show that equilibrium remains critical even
when firms have different propensities to learn from others. A second assumption in the
baseline model is that profits are additive across technologies. Equilibrium remains critical
if there are increasing or slightly decreasing returns to producing many technologies, and
indeed the key property is that payoffs are convex in the number of ideas known to a firm.
The structure of competition is important, however, and the baseline results described above
assume zero profits in competitive markets. If profits under competition are instead positive,
perhaps because of collusion between firms, then incentives toward secrecy will be weaker
and so equilibria will be above critical threshold.
Our final results ask how formal intellectual property rights change the incentives to
interact. Consider the consequences of granting patents to a positive fraction of ideas, e.g.,
allowing hardware but not software ideas to be patented. Patents mitigate firms’ incentives
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to be secretive, but can also discourage exchange of ideas. Firms with patents are more open
but are also less desirable partners in interactions (at least when ideas are only transmitted
directly). The resulting adverse selection in interaction can deter firms from collaborating
with others. We show that patent rights can therefore prevent any productive interactions
at equilibrium. If indirect learning is important, firms with patents will be informational
intermediaries, like the public innovators above. In this case there are benefits to allowing
patents, but the optimal policy is often to only allow patents for a very small fraction of
ideas.
At a technical level, this paper develops tools for analyzing decisions in network set-
tings with complementarities between indirect connections. Classical results in graph theory
characterize the component structure of the learning network, and thus the number of ideas
firms will learn, asymptotically (Karp, 1990 and  Luczak, 1990). But we will find that firms’
incentives also depend on how these ideas are learned, e.g. via many interactions or a few
interactions, so additional new techniques are needed. We derive an expression relating
behavior and the extent to which technologies combine ideas from distinct interactions. Es-
tablishing these findings requires a careful analysis of the graph branching process governing
the number of ideas learned from each interaction.
1.1 Related Literature
Existing models of innovation incorporating interactions between firms generally model these
interactions as either mechanical spillovers or learning via imitation. A common approach is
to choose a convenient functional form for spillovers, usually motivated by tractability within
a macroeconomic (e.g., Kortum, 1997) or network-theory (Ko¨nig, Battiston, Napoletano, and
Schweitzer, 2012) framework. By microfounding these spillovers, which arise endogenously
within the innovative process, we can study how spillovers vary across policy environments.
In a second approach, which relies on a quality-ladders framework, interactions give firms
a chance to catch up as innovation proceeds vertically (e.g., Akcigit, Caicedo, Miguelez,
Stantcheva, and Sterzi, 2018 and Ko¨nig, Lorenz, and Zilibotti, 2016). We instead explicitly
model horizontal innovation combinations of distinct ideas, which serve as building blocks.
Related models appear in Weitzman (1998) and Acemoglu and Azar (2019), which focus on
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the evolution of the total amount of innovation over time and do not involve learning or
informational spillovers between firms. We introduce tradeoffs between secrecy and learning
and find that the resulting incentives push toward an equilibrium at a critical threshold.4
At a more theoretical level, we develop a theory of strategic network formation with
probabilistic links. A large literature since Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal
(2000) considers endogenous network formation assuming that agents can choose their links
exactly.5 Because equilibrium is then characterized by a large system of inequalities, these
models illustrate key externalities in special cases but remain largely or entirely intractable
in many others. By incorporating uncertainty, we obtain a smooth model of link formation
that can be solved via basic optimization techniques combined with analyses of random
graphs.6
Under this random-network approach to network formation, incentives to form links
depend on the ‘phase transitions’ between sparse and dense networks. Related interactions
between phase transitions and optimal behavior have been recently explored in the context
of diffusion processes by Campbell (2013), Sadler (2019), and Akbarpour, Malladi, and
Saberi (2018), who let adoption and seeding decisions depend on component structure in an
underlying network. We instead study equilibria of a game in which agents endogenously
make decisions about how much to interact with others, and find there is a subtle interplay
between strategic incentives and the global network structure.
4By assuming a continuum of firms, macroeconomic models of imitation often implicitly restrict to sub-
critical interaction patterns.
5The pairwise stability solution concept from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and variants have been applied
to network formation in many settings, including innovation (Ko¨nig, Battiston, Napoletano, and Schweitzer,
2011, Ko¨nig, Battiston, Napoletano, and Schweitzer, 2012).
6An alternate approach to smooth network formation is to consider weighted networks, so that each
link has an intensity (Baumann, 2017 and Griffith, 2019). By analyzing random networks, we can study
continuous link-formation decisions without requiring network weights.
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2 Baseline Model
2.1 Basic Setup
There are n > 2 firms 1, . . . , n. Each firm i can potentially discover a distinct idea, also
denoted by i.7 We let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of ideas that are discovered.
Each firm i chooses a probability pi ∈ [0, 1) of discovering this idea and pays investment
cost c(pi). We will assume that c is continuously differentiable, increasing, and convex with
c(0) = 0 and limp→1− c(p) =∞. The realizations of discoveries are independent.
A technology t = {i1, . . . , ik} consists of k ideas i1, . . . , ik ∈ I, where k > 1 represents the
complexity of technologies.8 Each idea i ∈ t must be discovered by the corresponding firm
to be included in a technology. There are therefore
(
n
k
)
potential technologies, and a firm i
can produce more than one technology.
Each firm i chooses a level of openness qi ∈ [0, 1]. Given firms i and j’s choices qi and
qj, the interaction rate between i and j is
ι(qi, qj) = qiqj.
The timing of the model is simultaneous: firms choose actions pi and qi and then all
learning occurs. We denote actions by (p,q). When actions are symmetric, we will refer to
pi by p and qi by q.
Given actions p and q, we denote the set of ideas that firm i learns from others by
Ii(p,q) ⊂ I. This is a random set depending on realizations of links and discoveries. We
now describe how learning occurs.
With probability ι(qi, qj), firm i learns directly from firm j. In this case, firm i learns
idea j if j ∈ I. If firm i learns directly from firm j, then with probability δ ∈ [0, 1], firm
i also learns indirectly through firm j. In this case, firm i also learns all ideas in Ij(p,q).
All realizations of direct and indirect learning are independent, and in particular, firm i can
learn from firm j without j learning from i.
We will call the case δ = 0 direct learning and the case δ > 0 indirect learning.
7The model will extended in Appendix D to allow firms to potentially discover multiple ideas.
8In the baseline model, the parameter k is the same for all firms.
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When δ > 0 we define a directed network, which we call the indirect-learning network, with
nodes 1, . . . , n and a link from node j to node i if firm i learns indirectly through firm j.
A firm i receives payoff 1 from each technology proprietary technology t. A technology
t is a proprietary for firm i if (1) i ∈ t and (2) i is the unique firm such that j ∈ {i}∪Ii(p,q)
for all j ∈ t. In words, the technology contains firm i’s idea and firm i is the unique firm
that knows all ideas in the technology.
If t is not a proprietary technology for firm i, then firm i receives payoff 0 from the
technology t. In Section 5, we will consider more general payoff structures in which (1)
payoffs are not additive across technologies and (2) firms instead receive payoff f(m) if
m > 0 other firms know all ideas contained in a technology.
2.2 Example
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we describe a simple example with n = 4 firms and
complexity k = 3. Suppose that realizations are such that (1) ideas are discovered by firms
in I = {1, 3, 4} and (2) firm 1 learns indirectly through firm 2 and directly from firm 3, firm
3 learns indirectly through firm 1, and firm 3 learns directly from firm 4.
The network and ideas are shown in Figure 1. Black circles correspond to firms with
ideas i ∈ I, i.e. firms that discover ideas, while white circles correspond to firms with ideas
i /∈ I, i.e. firms that do not discover ideas. Solid arrows denote indirect learning links, while
dashed arrows indicate only direct learning occurred.
Since k = 3, the unique technology t consisting of ideas in I is t = {1, 3, 4}. We have
I1(p,q) = {3}, I2(p,q) = ∅, I3(p,q) = {1, 4}, I4(p,q) = ∅.
Because firm 3 is the unique firm such that t ⊂ Ii(p,q) ∪ {i} and we have 3 ∈ t, firm 3
produces the technology t and receives monopoly profit of one for that technology. There
are no profits from any other technologies.
Suppose instead that firm 1 also learns indirectly through firm 3, as shown in Figure 2.
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1 2
3 4
Figure 1: Network with four firms and k = 3. Black circles are firms that discover ideas
while white circles do not discover ideas. Dashed lines indicate direct learning and solid lines
indicate indirect learning. The only technology produced is t = {1, 3, 4} and firm 3 receives
monopoly profit.
1 2
3 4
Figure 2: Network with four firms and k = 3. Black circles are firms that discover ideas
while white circles do not discover ideas. Dashed lines indicate direct learning and solid lines
indicate indirect learning. The only technology produced is t = {1, 3, 4}, and there are no
profits because firms 1 and 3 both produce t.
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Then we have
I1(p,q) = {3, 4}, I2(p,q) = ∅, I3(p,q) = {1, 4}, I4(p,q) = ∅.
The only potential technology remains t = {1, 3, 4}. We now have t ⊂ Ii(p,q)∪{i} for both
firm 1 and firm 3, so both receive the competitive profit of zero for that technology. There
are also no profits from other technologies.
2.3 Interpretation and Discussion
Before expressing expected payoffs of firms and defining equilibrium, we discuss interpreta-
tion and assumptions in the model.
Actions: Firm actions are choices (pi, qi). The first component pi corresponds to a level
of investment in R&D. A small probability of a discovery is cheap, while probabilities close
to one are very expensive.
The second component qi corresponds to a level of openness or secrecy in interactions
with other firms. The action qi can include decisions such as whether to locate near other
firms and how much to send employees to conferences. An important feature of the model
is that increasing qi increases the probability that firm i learns from other firms but also
increases the probability that other firms learn from i.9 The baseline model assumes that
learning probabilities are symmetric: firm i learns from firm j with the same probability that
firm j learns from firm i. In Section 4, we allow firms to have heterogeneous propensities to
learn across firms and find this symmetric structure does not drive results.
The downside to interaction for firm i is exposure to other firms learning from i rather
than fixed link-formation costs. Because the costs of links are an endogenous feature of the
model, our equilibrium characterization does not depend on functional forms of costs, as it
would with exogenous link costs separate from the innovation process.
In Appendix E, we describe a related model in which firms instead face a tradeoff between
learning and private investment. In this extension, the probability that firm i learns from
firm j depends only on firm i’s action, and the downside to interaction comes from a budget
9Stein (2008) gives a microfoundation for bilateral communication in innovation.
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constraint on the interaction rate and private investment. The techniques we use extend
easily, and we find equilibrium depends on the rate at which firms can substitute between
interaction and private investment.
Formal and Informal Interactions: The model is meant to primarily describe informal
interactions between employees or firms, rather than more formal arrangements such as
licensing agreements or joint R&D ventures.10 As such, our results are most applicable
to industries where formal property rights are imperfectly enforced. Because information
transmitted via informal interactions can often spread several steps, an analysis considering
global network structure is particularly relevant.
In Appendix D, we compare the payoffs to firms with different numbers of private ideas.
This analysis can be equivalently interpreted as measuring the value of formal contracting
arrangements allowing multiple firms to share ideas frictionlessly. We find that as the number
of firms grows large, the benefits to such an arrangement are small compared to a firm’s
profits.
Interaction Rate: The multiplicative interaction rate
ι(qi, qj) = qiqj
has the feature that firm i’s probability of learning from another firm and that firm’s proba-
bility of learning from i are both proportional to qi. Thus, this is the (unique up to rescaling)
interaction rate that arises from a random matching process in which all agents choose a
search intensity and the probability of learning in both directions is proportional to that in-
tensity. See Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2011) for a microfoundation for a closely
related deterministic model.
Two key properties of the interaction rate are:
(1) ι(q, q′) = ι(q′, q) for all q and q′
(2) ι(q, 0) = 0 for all q.
Property (1) says that the interaction rate is symmetric, as discussed above. Property (2)
says that firms can choose not to interact with others. Much of the analysis, including our
10Storper and Venables (2004) discuss the importance of one form of informal interactions.
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existence and characterization results for symmetric equilibria, generalizes to any strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable interaction rate ι : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → ∞ satisfying
these properties.
Learning Network: A useful assumption is that if firm i learns indirectly through firm
j, then firm i learns all ideas known to j. This ensures that there is a well-defined learning
network, and this network is a central object in our analysis. If indirect learning were not
perfectly correlated across ideas, there would be a separate learning network for each idea.
Firm Profits: The positive payoffs from producing technologies correspond to monopoly
payoffs, which we normalize to 1.11 If multiple firms know all ideas contained in t, then there
is a competitive market and firms receive zero profits. This baseline payoff structure, which
we generalize in Section 5.2, corresponds to Bertrand competition.
Our setup requires that monopolist firms must have privately developed one of the ideas
in a technology to produce that technology, but competitors need not. To start a new
market, some expertise and/or confidence in the quality of the relevant idea is needed. Once
a market exists, however, entrants do not require this expertise, perhaps because relevant
details can be obtained from the competitor’s technology.
2.4 Payoffs
Given actions (p,q), we define the proprietary technologies PTi(p,q) for i to be the set of
technologies t such that i ∈ t, firm i learns all other ideas j ∈ t, and no other firm knows all
ideas in t. Note that this set is a random object depending on link realizations. Then the
expected payoff to firm i is
Ui(p,q) = E [|PTi(p,q)|]− c(pi).
To further illustrate payoffs, we write the cardinality of PTi(p,q) explicitly when δ = 1.
Recall that I(p,q) is the set of ideas learned by firm i given actions (p,q). Like PTi(p,q),
this is also a random object.
11We also assume that all technologies give the same monopoly profits and that these profits are deter-
ministic. It would be equivalent to take monopoly profits to be randomly drawn from any distribution with
finite mean, as long as firms have no information about the realizations a priori.
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When δ = 1, the expected payoffs to firm i are:
Ui(p,q) = pi · E
[(|Ii(p,q)|
k − 1
)]
·
∏
j 6=i
(1− ι(qi, qj))− c(pi).
A technology t that i profits from consists of i’s private idea, which is developed with
probability pi, and a choice of (k − 1) other ideas known to i. The firm j faces competition
if and only if some firm learns all of i’s ideas, and the probability that this does not occur is∏
j 6=i(1− ι(qi, qj)). Finally, the private investment cost is c(pi).
In general, a firm can face competition for a technology t in two ways. First, a firm j
can learn all of firm i’s ideas via indirect learning. Second, a firm j can learn i’s private
idea directly and then the other ideas in the technology t from links with firms other than
i. The probability of the second possibility is more difficult to express in closed form, and
in general depends on the technology t. We will show that when if there is not too much
interaction, then most competition comes via the first channel.
Payoffs in this model depend on the number of ideas known to a firm in a particular
combinatorial manner. We will consider allow payoffs to be a more general function of the
number of ideas learned in Section 5.1.
2.5 Solution Concept
We now define our solution concept:
Definition 1. An equilibrium (p∗,q∗) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium
(p∗,q∗) is an investment equilibrium if p∗i > 0 for all i.
Because all choices pi and qi are probabilities of discoveries or interactions, we restrict to
pure strategies.
If pi = 0 for all i, then any q will give an equilibrium: if no other firms are investing,
there is no reason to invest and so payoffs are zero. It is easy to see these trivial equilibria
always exist, and we will focus on investment equilibria.
For some of our results, it will also be useful to make the stronger assumption that
private investment is non-vanishing asymptotically. We consider a sequence of equilibria as
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the number of firms n→∞.
Definition 2. A sequence of equilibria has non-vanishing investment if
lim inf
n
min
i
p∗i > 0.
Depending on c(·), there may be equilibria at which all firms choose very low levels of
private investment because others are investing very little. The definition excludes these
partial coordination failures as well.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize equilibrium in our baseline model. Two assumptions that
facilitate this analysis are that firms are homogeneous (which we will relax in several ways,
including Section 4) and that profits are equal to the number of proprietary technologies
(which we relax in Section 5).
We first briefly describe investment equilibria under direct learning (δ = 0). The remain-
der of this section will characterize investment equilibria under indirect learning (δ > 0).
3.1 Direct Learning
We summarize results with δ = 0 here, and give a full analysis in Appendix C. In this case,
ideas can spread at most one step.
There exists a symmetric investment equilibrium for n large, and at any sequence of
symmetric investment equilibria the interaction rate is
ι(q∗, q∗) ≈
(
k − 1
n
) 1
k
.
Since the interaction rate is of order n−
1
k , the probability that a generic firm knows all the
ideas in a given technology is of order 1
n
. It follows that the probability that there exists
competition on a given technology is constant.
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We will see that interaction rates are higher than in the indirect-learning case. With only
direct learning much more interaction is needed to generate a substantial risk of competi-
tion, so the interaction rate must be higher for potential competition to meaningfully deter
openness.
A key feature of the direct learning environment is that interaction between firms j and
j′ imposes only a negative externality on a third firm i by increasing potential competition.
Therefore, decreasing openness would increase average profits. Formally, at the symmetric
equilibrium (p∗,q∗) we have:
lim
n→∞
∂Ui(p
∗,q)
∂q
(q∗) < 0.
Once indirect learning is introduced, interaction between firms j and j′ also imposes a positive
externality by facilitating indirect learning by firm i. We will compare the magnitudes of
these positive and negative externalities.
3.2 Indirect Learning
Our main focus is the indirect learning case (δ > 0) in which ideas can spread multiple
steps. Asymptotically, the structure of equilibrium will depend on the global structure of
the indirect-learning network. To better understand this dependence, we let the number of
firms n→∞ and begin with outcomes under a sequence of symmetric actions.
We say that an event occurs a.a.s. (asymptotically almost surely) if the probability of
this event converges to 1 as n → ∞. To simplify notation, we often omit the index n (e.g.,
from the actions (pi, qi).)
Recall that q = maxi qi and q = mini qi are the minimum and maximum of the level of
openness qi across players.
Definition 3. A sequence of symmetric actions with openness q is:
• Subcritical if lim supn ι(q, q)δn < 1
• Critical if limn ι(q, q)δn = 1
• Supercritical if lim infn ι(q, q)δn > 1
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The expected number of firms with links to i in the indirect-learning network is
ι(q, q)δ(n− 1),
so the three cases distinguish networks where each firm learns indirectly less than once,
approximately once, and more than once in expectation. In the subcritical case, it follows
that the expected number of firms that learn a given idea is a finite constant. In the
supercritical case, there is a positive probability that a given idea is learned by a large
number of firms (i.e., a number growing linearly in n).
This intuition is formalized by results from the theory of random directed graphs (Karp,
1990 and  Luczak, 1990). Adapting their results to this setting, we have the following result.
A component of a directed network is a strongly-connected component, i.e. a maximal set
of nodes such that there is a path from any node in the set to any other.
Lemma 1 (Theorem 1 of  Luczak (1990)). (i) If the indirect-learning network is subcritical,
then a.a.s. every component has size O(log n).
(ii) If the indirect-learning network is supercritical, then a.a.s. there is a unique compo-
nent of size at least α˜n for a constant α˜ ∈ (0, 1) depending on limn ι(q, q)δn, and all other
components have size O(log n).
These asymptotic results each imply that large finite graphs have the relevant component
structure with high probability. It follows from the lemma that in a subcritical sequence of
equilibria, all firms learn at most O(log n) ideas a.a.s. In a supercritical sequence of equilibria,
there is a positive fraction of firms learning a constant fraction of all ideas a.a.s. At a critical
equilibrium, the number of ideas learned lies between the subcritical and supercritical cases.
To generalize the notion of criticality to arbitrary strategies, consider the matrix (ι(qi, qj)δ)ij.
The entry (i, j) is equal to the probability that firm i learns indirectly from firm j. Let λ be
the largest eigenvalue of this matrix.
Definition 4. A sequence of symmetric actions with openness q is:
• Subcritical if lim supn λ < 1
• Critical if limn λ = 1
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• Supercritical if lim infn λ > 1
We will see that, as in Lemma 1, the critical threshold corresponds to the emergence
of a giant component. To show this, we will combine the results of Bloznelis, Go¨tze, and
Jaworski (2012) with analysis of multi-type branching processes.
Our existence result establishes that there are equilibria with non-zero investment and
communication. Our characterization result shows that asymptotically, equilibrium is on the
threshold between sparse and dense networks:
Theorem 1. For n sufficiently large, there exists a symmetric investment equilibrium. Any
sequence of investment equilibria is critical.
At a sequence of symmetric investment equilibrium, the theorem implies that
ι(q∗, q∗)→ 1
δn
,
and in particular symmetric investment equilibria are asymptotically unique.
We are able to drop the assumption of symmetric strategies, which is standard in set-
tings involving random networks (e.g., Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009, Sadler, 2019, and
Golub and Livne, 2010), and show any equilibrium is at the critical threshold. Asymmetric
equilibria could feature firms with ι(q∗i , q
∗
i ) above and below
1
δn
.
While the proof of Theorem 1 relies on existing mathematical results on large random
graphs, there are several obstacles to applying these results. First, there are complementari-
ties between ideas, so payoffs do not simply depend on the number of ideas learned. Second,
link probabilities are endogenous, which in particular means that lower-order terms in link
probabilities and vanishing-probability events can matter asymptotically. We now discuss
the key ideas in the proof.
Proof Intuition. We describe the basic idea of the proof in the case δ = 1, and the general
argument is similar. We also begin by discussing symmetric strategies.
We will use the first-order condition for qi and the assumption of symmetry to characterize
equilibrium behavior. When δ = 1, whether a firm i faces competition depends only on
whether another firm j has learned from i. Since profits are zero when a firm j has learned
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from i, we can take firm i’s first-order condition in qi conditioning on the event that no firm
has yet learned from i. We can also condition on firm i discovering its private idea since
profits are zero otherwise.
The first-order condition says that at any best response, the cost to firm i of having a firm
j learn from i and is equal to the benefit from learning from an additional firm j. Applying
this to a firm i at equilibrium, we obtain:
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
=
1
q∗(n− 1) · E
[
∂
(|Ii(p∗,qi,q∗−i)|
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗)
]
(1)
Recall that Ii(p
∗,q∗) is the set of ideas learned by firm i, which is a random variable. The
left-hand side is the cost of an outgoing link, which erases the monopoly payoffs from any
technologies produced by i. The right-hand side is the marginal benefit from increasing the
probability of learning from each other firm by 1
n−1 , which is approximately the marginal
benefit from an additional outgoing link.
A key feature of equation (1) is that the left-hand side and right-hand side both depend
on the distribution of the number of ideas learned from a given link. We will exploit this
symmetry between costs and benefits to solve for q∗n. We are able to do so because of the
endogenous downside to outgoing links, which depends on the number of ideas that firm i
learns.
We use the first-order condition in equation (1) to obtain an expression for q∗n in terms
of the number of incoming links used to learn the ideas in an average proprietary technology.
Consider a technology t such that i produces t and gets monopoly profits. This technology
is a combination of ideas learned from different links. For example, if k = 4, an example
technology could consist of i’s private idea, two ideas learned indirectly from firm j, and
one idea learned directly from firm j′′. In this example, the technology would combine ideas
from three different links.
More generally behavior will depend on the number of links utilized in learning the ideas
in a technology t. We refer to this number of links as τ(t), so that τ(t) = 3 in the example
in the previous paragraph. The key tool, which we state in the subcritical region, is:
Lemma 2. Along any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria with lim sup δι(q∗, q∗)n <
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1,
δι(q∗, q∗)n ∼ Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)]
for all i.
Lemma 2 says that the expected number of other firms from whom i learns is equal to
the expected value of τ(t) for a random proprietary technology t. We give a brief intuition
for the lemma. If τ(t) is higher, then there are stronger complementarities between links,
because produced technologies combine ideas from more links. In this case, if a firm has a
few existing links, an additional link will be more valuable than an existing link due to these
complementarities. Since additional links are relatively more valuable, firms are willing to
interact more.
Since τ(t) is always at least one, Lemma 2 implies that
lim
n
ι(q∗, q∗)n ≥ 1,
so there cannot be a subcritical equilibrium.
In the supercritical region, almost all proprietary technologies t ∈ PTi(p∗,q∗) are created
by combining a private idea with (k− 1) ideas learned from observing the giant component.
In particular, payoffs are determined up to lower order terms by whether firm i has a link
that provides a connection to the giant component. Given such a link, additional links add
little value.12 Thus there are not substantial complementarities between links, and indeed
are potential redundancies.
But because firms have more to lose from an outgoing link in the supercritical region,
complementarities between links are needed to sustain high interaction rates. Since these
complementarities are not present, there is not a supercritical equilibrium either. We check
this intuition formally by straightforward algebra.
Extending results to asymmetric equilibria presents several additional technical obstacles.
One is that existing mathematical results, e.g., Bloznelis, Go¨tze, and Jaworski (2012), prove
12This would not be the case if firms could produce technologies of any complexity. Then payoffs grow at
an exponential rather than polynomial rate in the number of ideas learned, so additional ideas can be very
valuable, as in the growth model of Acemoglu and Azar (2019).
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the component structure has certain properties asymptotically almost surely. But this does
not remove the possibility that vanishing-probability events distort incentives in an unknown
direction. To rule this out, we show that an arbitrary subcritical sequence of equilibria,
lim
n→∞
P[|Ii(p,q)| = y]
decays exponentially in y. The proof bounds |Ii(p,q)| above with the number of nodes in a
multi-type Poisson branching process and then analyzes this branching process.
We prove the existence result and characterization of symmetric equilibria for any strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable interaction rate ι : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying:
(1) ι(q, q′) = ι(q′, q) for all q and q′
(2) ι(q, 0) = 0 for all q.
We rely on the multiplicative functional form ι(qi, qj) = qiqj to extend the characterization
from symmetric equilibria to arbitrary equililbria.
Theorem 1 makes a sharp prediction about equilibrium. This depends on the specification
of payoffs, which are linear in the number of monopoly technologies produced by a firm. We
consider how our equilibrium characterization extends to more general payoffs in Section 5.
3.3 Welfare and Policy Implications
We next discuss welfare consequences of Theorem 1. At any critical sequence of equilibria,
the number of ideas |Ii(p∗,q∗)| learned by each firm is o(n) asymptotically almost surely.
Since each firm can produce at most
(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k−1
)
proprietary technologies,
Ui(p
∗,q∗) = o(nk−1).
Suppose instead that all firms choose (p, q) where p > 0 and limn ι(q, q)δn ∈ (1,∞).
Then if α ∈ (0, 1) is fraction of ideas that are learned by all firms in the giant component
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asymptotically almost surely,
Ui(p,q) = (p)
kα
(
αn
k − 1
)
(1− δ · ι(q, q)− (1− δ) · ι(q, q) · α)n−1 − c(p) + o(nk−1). (2)
Asymptotically almost surely, a firm learns all ideas learned by the giant component with
probability α. In this case, the firm learns αn + o(n) ideas and therefore can produce
approximately
(
αn
k−1
)
potential technologies. As we show in the proof of Theorem 1, the
probability of facing competition on a given technology is approximately
(1− δ · ι(q, q)− (1− δ) · ι(q, q) · α)n−1.
Since ι(q, q)δn converges, this probability converges to a positive constant. So the growth
rate of Ui(p,q) is of order n
k−1.
Thus, average payoffs are much higher in the supercritical region than the critical region
when the number of firms is large. Theorem 1 showed that nevertheless individual incentives
to be secretive lead to a critical equilibrium.
Interactions impose two externalities on a firm i that is not directly involved: (1) there
is a positive externality as these interactions can lead to more indirect learning by i, and (2)
there is a negative externality, because these interactions can lead to potential competition
with i. In the subcritical and critical range, the positive externality dominates. This is
because most competition comes from firms that learn indirectly through i and thus the
negative externality has little impact.
We could also consider social welfare by including the surplus obtained by consumers
from monopoly products and competitive products. It follows easily that the socially optimal
outcome will be in the supercritical range, like the outcome maximizing average firm profits.13
We can relate these findings to Saxenian (1996)’s study of the Route 128 and Silicon
Valley technology industries, which found that Silicon Valley had much more open firms
13More formally, suppose that consumer surplus is Wc from each product with a competitive market and
Wm from each product with a monopoly, where Wc ≥ Wm ≥ 0. We can then define social welfare to be
the sum of total producer payoffs and consumer surplus. The expected number of competitive products
and the expected number of total products produced are both increasing in q when firms choose symmetric
strategies. Therefore, the findings in the section that increasing q will increase average profits extend to
social welfare.
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and grew faster. In the terminology of our model, Route 128’s secrecy corresponds to equi-
librium behavior. But institutional features of Silicon Valley (including non-enforcement of
non-compete clauses and common ownership of firms by venture capital firms) may have
constrained firms’ actions to prevent high levels of secrecy (subcritical or critical choices of
qi).
Theorem 1 and equation (2) have several policy implications, which we state informally
and then as formal results:
• At or near equilibrium outcomes, there are large gains to policies (e.g. non-enforcement
of non-compete clauses, establishing innovation clusters) that encourage or require
more interaction between firms and thus shift outcomes to the supercritical region
• Policies to increase private investment (e.g. subsidies for R&D) will not shift outcomes
to the supercritical region, and thus have much smaller benefits at equilibrium
• But once outcomes are in the supercritical region, policies to increase private invest-
ment will have large gains.
We can formalize the first bullet point:
Corollary 1. For any sequence of equilibria (p∗,q∗) with non-vanishing investment and any
 > 0,
lim
n→∞
Ui(p
∗, (1 + )q∗)
Ui(p∗,q∗)
=∞.
The first corollary says that at equilibrium increasing all qi by any multiplicative factor
has a very large effect on payoffs asymptotically. The proof shows that such an increase will
change payoffs from o(nk−1) to a polynomial of order nk−1.
We also give the second and third bullet points in a corollary:
Corollary 2. For any sequence of equilibria (p∗,q∗) with non-vanishing investment and any
 > 0,
lim
n→∞
∂Ui(p
∗+x1,(1+)q∗)
∂x (0)
∂Ui(p∗+x1,q∗)
∂x (0)
=∞.
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Subcritical Critical Supercritical
Best Response qi High Intermediate Low
Average Payoffs Constant Intermediate Polynomial
Increasing q Large Benefit Large Benefit Ambiguous
Increasing p Small Benefit Intermediate Large Benefit
Table 1: Best responses and policy implications when firms choose symmetric strategies
(p,q) in the subcritical, critical, and supercritical regions.
If all firms are choosing private investment level p∗, increasing private investment slightly
has a much larger effect in the supercritical region than at equilibrium. The proof shows
that the effect of increasing p is o(nk−1) at equilibrium but polynomial of order nk−1 in this
supercritical region.
3.4 Public Innovators
Corollary 1 showed there are large gains to increasing interaction rates above equilibrium
levels. A natural question is whether these gains be realized via policy interventions other
than directly restricting firms’ strategy spaces.
We now show that introducing public innovators who are not concerned with secrecy
leads to learning and innovation at the same rate as in the supercritical region. These public
innovators correspond to academics or government researchers with incentives or motivations
other than profiting from producing and selling technologies.
A public innovator i pays investment cost c(pi) and receives a payoff of one for each
technology t such that: (1) i ∈ t and (2) j ∈ {i} ∪ Ii(p,q) for all j ∈ t. We will rely on
the fact that for public innovators there is no downside to interactions, but not on the exact
incentive structure.
All firms have the same incentives as in the baseline model, and public innovators and
firms interact as in the baseline model. We now call an equilibrium symmetric if all public
innovators choose the same action and the same holds for all private firms.
Proposition 1. Suppose a non-vanishing share of agents are public innovators. Then there
exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria with non-vanishing investment, and at any sequence
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of equilibria with non-vanishing investment
lim inf
n
Ui(p
∗,q∗)(
n−1
k−1
) > 0
for all firms i.
The proposition says that at equilibrium, firms’ payoffs are at least a constant fraction of
the maximum achievable profits
(
n−1
k−1
)
. Thus payoffs are of order nk−1, as in the supercritical
region without public innovators. This holds for any positive share of public innovators, and
indeed could be extended to a slowly vanishing share of public innovators.
Public innovators are valuable primarily as informational intermediaries rather than for
their private ideas. Because public innovators do not face costs to interaction, they will
choose qi = 1 at equilibrium. Therefore, public innovators can learn many ideas via interac-
tions and transmit these ideas to other public innovators or to private firms (e.g, academics
learning ideas from conferences and collaborations and then consulting for private industry).
Conversely, the proposition would remain unchanged if all public innovators instead choose
pi = 0 and qi = 1.
Empirical research on collaboration between academia and industry supports the value
of academic researchers as informational intermediaries between firms. Azoulay, Graff Zivin,
and Sampat (2012) study movement of star academics, and find that moves increase patent-
to-patent and patent-to-article citations locally. Moreover, Jong and Slavova (2014) find
that firms that disclose high-quality R&D through publications with academics are more
innovative, suggesting information flows exhibit symmetry properties within interactions.
Proposition 1 assumes that firms cannot differentially interact with public innovators
and private firms. In Appendix F, we show the same result holds when interactions can be
directed toward public innovators or private firms.
4 Asymmetric Learning Probabilities
The baseline model assumes that information flows are symmetric across pairs of firms. In
practice, firms may have hetereogeneous probabilities of learning from others, even give a
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fixed interaction rate.
Suppose instead that firm i directly learns from firm j with probability
βiι(qi, qj),
where the propensity to learn βi ∈ [β, 1) for some β ∈ (0, 1). Learning otherwise occurs as
in the baseline model, including indirect learning.
It is straightforward to extend Definition 4 to allow heterogeneous secrecy. We now let
λ be the spectral radius of the matrix (βiι(qi, qj)δ)ij. As before entry (i, j) is equal to the
probability that firm i learns indirectly from firm j. Let λ be the spectral radius of this
matrix.
Definition 5. A sequence of symmetric actions with openness q is:
• Subcritical if lim supn λ < 1
• Critical if limn λ = 1
• Supercritical if lim infn λ > 1
Again, the critical threshold corresponds to the emergence of a giant component.
Theorem 2. Suppose firms have propensities to learn β. There exists an investment equi-
librium for n large and any sequence of investment equilibria is critical.
Equilibria remain critical even when the directed link probabilities are asymmetric across
pairs. The characterization result extends immediately to the case in which βi are chosen
endogenously at a cost c˜i(βi), which can vary across firms.
14 In this case, firms can now
control the likelihood of learning along two dimensions. First, higher interaction rates allow
a firm to learn more from from others at the expense of a higher probability of its ideas
leaking. Second, firms can pay an exogenous cost to increase the probability of learning
from others at a given interaction rate, and some firms may be able to do so more cheaply
than others.
14This choice can be made simultaneously with or prior to the choice of qi.
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The proof of Theorem 2 shows that decisions with asymmetric learning probabilities
are similar to decisions in the baseline model. Recall that at equilibrium, the first-order
condition for the openness qi relates the number the value of the ideas already known to
firm i with the value of increasing the interaction rate. Fixing qi, a higher βi increases both
sides of this first-order condition because firms with higher propensities to learn have already
learned more ideas but also will learn more from an additional interaction.
In the subcritical region, these two forces cancel out and a firm’s equilibrium choice of
openness q∗i is approximately independent of that firm’s cost of secrecy c˜i(βi). While the
opposing effects do not entirely cancel in the supercritical region, we show that even firms
with high βi will still choose low q
∗
i because those firms have more to lose from outgoing
links.
5 Structure of Profits
In Sections 2 and 3, we studied equilibrium when expected payoffs were
Ui(p,q) = E [|PTi(p,q)|]− c(pi).
Firms’ utility function had two properties:
1. Payoffs are linear in the number of proprietary technologies, and
2. Payoffs do not depend on technologies for which the firm faces competition.
We now relax each of these assumptions. We find that equilibrium remains critical when
the returns to producing more technologies are increasing. Changing the profit structure in
competitive markets, however, leads to supercritical or subcritical equilibria.
5.1 Concavity of Profits
The baseline model assumed that a firm’s profits are linear in the number of proprietary
technologies. In practice, there may be increasing or decreasing returns to producing more
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technologies. Suppose that the payoffs to firm i are instead
|PTi(p,q)|ρ − c(pi),
where ρ > 0.
The baseline model is the case ρ = 1. When ρ > 1, there are increasing returns to
controlling more monopolies. When ρ < 1, there are decreasing returns to controlling more
monopolies. Note that these increasing or decreasing returns to scale are not determined by
the innovative process, but rather by production costs or other market conditions.
Proposition 2. There exists ρ ≤ 1 such that for any ρ ≥ ρ, any sequence of symmetric
investment equilibria is critical. When k > 2, we have ρ < 1.
The proposition shows that the prediction of critical equilibria is not knife-edge with
respect to ρ. In particular, increasing returns to scale cannot move interactions above the
critical threshold. As long as k 6= 2, slightly decreasing returns to scale will not move
interactions below the critical threshold either.
Consider a firm i that does not face competition. We show that under the conditions of
the proposition, the firm’s profits are convex in |Ii(p,q)|. As a result, learning additional
ideas is more appealing relative to protecting existing ideas, so openness will not decrease
below the critical region. Checking concavity is delicate when ρ < 1, because in this case
firm profits are the composition of the binomial coefficient
(|Ii(p,q)|
k−1
)
, which is convex, and
the polynomial, |PTi(p,q)|ρ, which is concave.
We also show that for any ρ, openness will not increase enough to push equilibrium into
the supercritical region either. At a potential supercritical sequence of investment equilibria,
profits are driven by the event that firm i learns from the giant component and produces
(p∗)k
(
αn
k − 1
)
proprietary technologies, where α is the share of ideas learned by the giant component.
Firm i chooses qi to maximize the probability of this event. Asymptotically the optimal qi
is independent of the payoffs from this event since these payoffs are very large, and therefore
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the optimal qi is independent of ρ. Given this, the calculation is the same as in the case
ρ = 1 (Theorem 1), where there is no supercritical sequence of investment equilibria.
More generally, the proof shows that our criticality result relies on two features of the
payoff function. First, payoffs for a firm i that does not face competition are convex in the
number of ideas |Ii(p,q)| learned by i. Second, payoffs grow at a polynomial rate in the
number of ideas learned by i.
We can state this formally when δ = 1, so that when firm i learns from j it will learn all
ideas known to firm i. In this case, we let the profits for firm i be φ(|Ij(p,q|) when firm i
discovers its private idea (i ∈ I) and no firm learns from i, and 0 otherwise. We will assume
that φ(·) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable.
Proposition 3. Suppose δ = 1 and payoffs when no firm learns from i and i ∈ I are equal
to φ(|Ii(p,q|), where φ(x) is convex and
φ(xj)
φ(x′j)
→ 1
along any sequence of (xj, x
′
j) such that
xi
x′i
→ 1. Then any sequence of symmetric equilibria
with non-vanishing investment is critical.
In particular, the assumption that
φ(xi)
φ(x′i)
→ 1
along any sequence of (xi, x
′
i) such that
xi
x′i
→ 1 holds if
φ(x) = Cxd +O(xd)
for any C > 0 and d ≥ 1. If payoffs instead grow at an exponential rate in the number of
ideas, then a supercritical equilibrium is possible because an additional idea may be very
valuable (see Acemoglu and Azar, 2019 for a related effect).
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5.2 Profits Under Competition
We found in Theorem 1 that equilibrium lies on the critical threshold. This result is robust
to different payoffs structures for monopolist firms. We now show that Theorem 1 does
depend on the structure of competition, and show that altering payoffs from competitive
markets can lead to supercritical or subcritical outcomes.
To generalize the payoff from technologies, we will now assume that firm i receives payoffs
f(m) from a technology t such that i ∈ t, firm i learns all other ideas in t, and m other firms
learn all ideas in t, where f(·) is weakly decreasing. We take the normalization f(0) = 1.
A simple case is f(m) = a < 1 for all m > 0. The analysis in previous sections corre-
sponded to the case a = 0.
We can also allow f(m) < 0, which could correspond to a fixed cost of production that
must be paid before competition is known. We assume that firms make a single decision
about whether to produce the technologies that they learn.15
Proposition 4. (i) If 0 < f(1) < 1 and f(m) ≥ 0 for all m, then there exists a symmetric
investment equilibrium for n large and any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria is
supercritical.
(ii) If f(m) < 0 for all m > 0, then any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria is
subcritical.
Part (i) says that if the potential downside to enabling competitors is not as large, then
firms will be more willing to interact. This pushes the equilibrium from the critical threshold
into the supercritical region. Cournot competition, for example, would correspond to f(m)
satisfying the conditions of part (i) of the proposition.
Proposition 4(i) introduces an additional force to classic debates on whether firms are
more innovative in more competitive markets (see Cohen and Levin, 1989 for a survey).
While much of this literature considers how competition changes firms’ private incentives to
conduct R&D, the proposition considers its effect on interaction and learning between firms.
Part (ii) says that increasing the costs of competition discourages interaction, and pushes
15If firms can condition their production decision on the flow of ideas, the analysis becomes more compli-
cated.
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the equilibrium to the subcritical region. There need not be an investment equilibrium if
payoffs under competition are sufficiently negative.
The proof of (ii) is more involved, as we must characterize payoffs at a critical sequence
of equilibria. The key is the following lemma, which states that at the critical threshold,
most of firm i’s proprietary technologies only include ideas learned from one other firm.
Lemma 3. For any critical sequence of symmetric actions with p > 0,
lim
n→∞
Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)] = 1.
We use a pair of coupling arguments to show that most profits come from rare events in
which a single link (indirectly) lets a firm learn many ideas. Comparing critical equilibria to
subcritical equilibria near the critical threshold, we find that the expected number of ideas
learned by a firm grows large. Then by comparing critical equilibria to supercritical equilibria
near the threshold, we verify that the probability of learning a large number of ideas is small.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we show that few technologies are produced by two or
more of these rare events occurring simultaneously.
6 Patent Rights
In the baseline model, technologies could only be protected via secrecy. We now consider
the possibility that a positive fraction of firms receive patents on their ideas. As motivation
for this setup, suppose that firms discover different types of ideas and patent law determines
which types are patentable. For example, Bessen and Hunt (2007) discuss the boundaries of
patent law in the software industry and how those boundaries have changed over time.
More precisely, a fraction b ∈ (0, 1), of firms receive a patent on their private ideas.
In this case, other firms cannot use this private idea, either as monopolists or competitors.
Formally, a firm i receives payoff 1 from each technology t such that (1) idea i ∈ t; (2) firm
i knows all j ∈ t and no other j ∈ t receive patents; and (3) either i receives a patent or i is
the unique firm that knows all j ∈ t. Else the firm receives payoff 0 from the technology t.
If firms choose their level of openness before knowing if their idea is patentable, then
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any sequence of investment equilibria is supercritical. Patents substitute for secrecy, and
firms can now interact more because with positive probability there will be no downside to
interactions. The result and proof are similar to Proposition 4(i), and we omit the details.
Suppose instead that firms can condition their level of openness on whether their idea
is patentable. A firm now chooses levels of openness qi(0), which is the action without a
patent, and qi(1), which is action with a patent.
16 We will refer to the choices at symmetric
equilibria as q∗(0) and q∗(1).
For the first part of the following result (δ = 0), we will also assume that each firm i
pays cost  > 0 for each realized link. The purpose of this cost is to break near-indifferences
in favor of lower interaction rates. We observe in Appendix C that without patents, a small
link cost  has little effect on the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Suppose a fraction b ∈ (0, 1) of firms receive patents. If δ = 0, then with
k = 2 and any link cost  > 0, there does not exist an investment equilibrium for n large. If
δ > 0, then ι(q∗(0), q∗(0)) is o(1/n) along sequence of any symmetric investment equilibria.
With only direct learning (δ = 0), the proposition says that positive investment cannot
be sustained at equilibrium for n large.17 This is because of an adverse-selection effect that
discourages social interactions.
Because firms receiving patents have no need for secrecy, firms choose very high interac-
tion rates qi(1). Thus, most interactions are with firms with patents. On the other hand,
firms with patents are undesirable to interact with because their ideas cannot be used by
others. Because of this adverse selection in the matching process, firms without patents will
have much lower expected profits than in the model without patents. When k = 2 and there
is an arbitrarily small cost to links, this has the effect of shutting down all interaction and
investment.
This contrasts with our results on direct learning with no patent rights (Section 3.1 and
Appendix C), where there is an investment equilibrium with substantial interaction. With
k > 2 and patent rights, the adverse selection effect persists but no longer prevents any
16We do not allow firms to discriminate in their interactions based on others’ patents.
17Formally, for all n sufficiently large, all equilibria have p∗ = 0. When there is no private investment,
firms are indifferent to all choices of interaction rates.
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equilibrium investment. In this case, the interaction rate between firms without patents is
much lower asymptotically than in the result with no patent rights (Appendix C.1).
The direct learning result also suggests a more general adverse-selection effect in strategic
network formation. Suppose that agents with lower link formation costs are also less valuable
partners for connections. If agents cannot discriminate in their link formation decisions, the
composition of the pool of potential partners will discourage connections.
With indirect learning, firms with patents still do not provide private ideas to others, but
can now serve as informational intermediaries. The equilibrium learning network now has the
following form: there is a clique of firms with patents, as there is no downside to interaction
for such firms and so q∗(1) = 1. Firms without patents now have some interactions with
firms without patents, who can transmit ideas from other firms without patents. Interactions
between pairs of firms without patents, however, are rare.
Proposition 5 relates to several strands of literature on patent rights. A theoretical
and empirical literature, considers firms’ choices between formal and informal intellectual
property protections, particularly patents versus secrecy (e.g., Anton and Yao, 2004, Kultti,
Takalo, and Toikka, 2006, and the survey Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and Sena, 2014). We
focus not on the choice between formal and intellectual property rights but on the interplay
between the two. The proposition finds that in markets with some patent rights, firms must
sacrifice more learning to achieve a given level of secrecy.
A second contrast is to theoretical findings on patents and follow-up innovation (e.g.,
Scotchmer, 1991, Scotchmer and Green, 1990, Bessen and Maskin, 2009). This literature
investigates when granting patent rights for an idea decreases follow-up innovations involving
that idea. In our random-interactions setting, patent rights can not only decrease follow-up
innovations involving patent ideas but also decrease follow-up innovations involving other
unprotected ideas.
We can use Theorem 1 and Proposition 5 to ask when patent rights improve welfare and
what the optimal fraction b of patentable ideas would be. In the direct-learning case, the
proposition gives conditions under which patents are harmful.
In the indirect-learning case, average firm profits and social welfare are higher with
interior patent rights b ∈ (0, 1) than no patent rights because firms with patents are valuable
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Figure 3: Average profits from monopoly products for n large as a function of the patent
share b, when δ = 1 and k = 2, 3, 5, and 10.
as intermediaries. Under indirect learning, we can ask what value of b maximizes average
payoffs. Any positive b provides the benefits of information intermediaries, and so there
is a tradeoff between the higher private profits obtained by firms with patents and the
social benefits provided by firms without patents. The optimal value of b can be interior
asymptotically for low k, but for high k the optimal value of b converges to zero as n grows
large.
This is easiest to see when δ = 1. In this case, we can compute that
e−bq
∗(0)n ≈ 1
2
.
so the average firm profits are approximately
(p∗)k−1
(
1
2
(1− b)n
k − 1
)
(b+
1
4
· (1− b)).
We graph these profits for n large and different values of k in Figure 3. The value of b∗
maximizing average firm profits converges to 1
3
as n→∞ when k = 2 and converges to 1
9
as
n→∞ when k = 3. For k ≥ 4, the optimal share of patents b∗ → 0 as n→∞.
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7 Conclusion
We have studied strategic network formation in large random graphs in the context of an
economic application to innovation and social learning. The model is particularly suited
to analysis of informal interactions, e.g. between employees of firms, which cannot be fully
governed by formal contracts. We find that in these settings, if there are many firms and ideas
can travel multiple steps, the global structure of the learning network has stark consequences
for incentives and payoffs. In particular, expected payoffs and welfare are much higher in
dense learning networks rather than sparse learning networks.
While we have focused on a network-formation game with a tradeoff between secrecy and
learning, we have developed more broadly applicable tools for network settings, particularly
with complementarities between connections. In Appendix E, we show that our analysis
extends easily to a related model where the key tradeoff is between private investment and
interaction. Beyond this particular extension, the techniques apply more generally to network
formation games in large random graphs. Outside of network formation, the same techniques
can also be applied to optimizing diffusion processes, e.g. determining the optimal number of
seeds for a new product or technology. This includes settings with complementarities across
adopters, such as diffusion of a new social media app.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We will first prove Theorem 1. We begin by describing the analysis of symmetric equilibria,
and show that there exists a sequence of symmetric investment equilibria and any sequence
of symmetric investment equilibria is critical. We then extend the characterization to show
that any sequence of investment equilibria, which need not be symmetric, is critical.
In all appendices, we say that f(n) ∼ g(n) if f(n)/g(n)→ 1 as n→∞.
A.1 Symmetric Investment Equilibria
We begin by describing the structure of this section.
1. We first show that there does not exist a subcritical sequence of symmetric investment
equilibria. The proof assumes such a sequence exists for the sake of contradiction and
characterizes equilibrium learning and behavior via three lemmas. The first states that
the probability of a firm learning a large number of ideas decays exponentially. The
second gives a first-order condition for the choice of qi. The first and second lemmas
are used to prove the third, which shows that δι(q∗, q∗)n is approximately equal to an
expectation E[τ(t)], where τ(t) is the number of links needed to learn the ideas in the
technology t. Because τ(t) ≥ 1 for all t, this implies that lim infn δι(q∗, q∗)n is at least
one. But this contradicts the assumption that the sequence of equilibria is subcritical.
2. We then show that there does not exist a supercritical sequence of symmetric invest-
ment equilibria. We show that at given a supercritical sequence of symmetric actions,
the payoffs for firm i can be computed (to first order) based on whether firm i learns
the ideas learned from the giant component and which firms learn from i. Using this
fact, we can compute the highest-order term in the firm i’s payoffs directly. We show
that at any supercritical sequence of symmetric investment equilibria each firm i would
prefer to deviate to a lower choice of qi for n large.
3. We finally show that there exists a symmetric investment equilibrium for n large.
The argument uses Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, which we show applies using the
preceding analysis.
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Subcritical Case: Our first lemma shows that at a potential sequence of subcritical in-
vestment equilibria, the probability of learning a large number of ideas decays exponentially.
Lemma A1. Along any sequence of investment equilibria with δι(q, q)n < 1, there exists
C > 0 and y such that the probability that
P[|Ii(p∗,q∗)| = y] ≤ e−Cy
for all y ≥ y and all i and n.
Proof. Let IDi(q
∗) be the set of firms j such that there is a path from i to j in the indirect-
learning network. Then Ii(p
∗,q∗) is the set of ideas such that idea j is discovered (j ∈ I)
and j ∈ IDi(q∗) or some firm in IDi(q∗) learns directly from j. The probability each firm
in IDi(q
∗) learns directly from j is at most ι(q, q), so |Ii(p∗,q∗)| is first-order stochastically
dominated by the sum of IDi(q
∗) random variables distributed as Binom(n, ι(q, q)).
We claim that |IDi(q∗)| is first-order stochastically dominated by the number of nodes
in the Poisson branching process with parameter ι(q, q)δ. To prove this, it is sufficient to
show that a random variable with distribution Poisson(ι(q, q)δn) first-order stochastically
dominates a random variable with distribution Binom(n, ι(q, q)δ), as IDi(q
∗) is the set
of nodes in a branching process with the distribution of offspring first-order stochastically
dominated by Binom(n, ι(q, q)δ). By Theorem 1(f) of Klenke and Mattner (2010), this holds
if
(1− δq∗)n ≤ e−ι(q,q)δn.
Letting C ′ = ι(q, q)δn, we observe that (1− C′
n
)n is increasing in n and converges to e−C
′
, so
the inequality holds.
Now, a standard result shows that there are y nodes in the Poisson branching process
with probability
e−C
′y(C ′y)y−1
y!
(Theorem 11.4.2 of Alon and Spencer, 2004). Using Stirling’s approximation, we can ap-
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proximate this probability as
1√
2pi
y−
3
2 (C ′)−1(C ′e1−C
′
)y.
In particular, this probability decays exponentially because C ′e1−C
′
< 1 for positive C ′ 6= 1.
Since |Ii(p∗,q∗)| is first-order stochastically dominated by the sum of IDi(q∗) random
variables distributed as Binom(n, ι(q, q)), by the central limit theorem, the probability that
|Ii(p∗,q∗)| = y
also decays exponentially in y.
Our second lemma expresses the first-order condition for qi at a subcritical sequence of
investment equilibria.
Lemma A2. Along any sequence of investment equilibria with δι(q, q)n < 1,
δ
∑
j 6=i
∂ι(qi, q
∗
j )
∂qi
(q∗i ) · E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
∼ E
[
∂
(|Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i)|
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗i )
]
for each i.
Proof. Suppose other players choose actions p−i and q−i.
We claim that due to the assumption that δι(q, q)n < 1, competition that is not based
on learning of all of firm i’s ideas indirectly is lower order. More formally, let Ti(p,q) be
the set of technologies t such that i ∈ t and firm i learns all other ideas j ∈ t.18 The claim
is that if there does not exist a link from firm i to another firm j in the indirect-learning
network, the conditional probability
Et∈Ti(p∗,q∗)[1t∈PTi(p∗,q∗)]
that t ∈ PTi(p∗,q∗) for a technology t ∈ Ti(p∗,q∗) chosen at random converges to one. Here,
18Recall that PTi(qi, q−i) ⊂ Ti(p,q) is the subset of technologies t such that no other firm learns all ideas
in t.
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each technology t ∈ Ti(p∗,q∗) under a given realization of all random variables is chosen
with probability proportional to the probability of that realization.
Suppose t ∈ Ti(p∗,q∗) and choose some j ∈ t distinct from i. By Lemma A1, the
probability that a given firm j′ learns y ≥ y ideas decays exponentially in y at a rate
independent of n. By independence, the probability that firm j′ learns ideas i and j is at
most o( 1
n
). Therefore, the probability that any firm j′ learns ideas i and j is at most o(1).
The technology t ∈ PTi(p,q) if there is no such j′ for any j ∈ t distinct from i, so this proves
the claim.
Thus, we can express the expected utility of player i choosing pi ∈ [0, 1) and qi ≥ 0 as
piE
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]∏
j 6=i
(1− δ · ι(qi, qj))− c(pi) + o(1),
We first note that the optimal qi does not depend on pi or p−i, but instead is chosen to
maximize
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]∏
j 6=i
(1− δ · ι(qi, qj)) + o(1).
The first-order condition gives
δE
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]∑
j 6=i
∂ι(qi, q
∗
j )
∂qi
(q∗i )(1− δ · ι(qi, qj))−1 ∼ ∂E
[(|Ii(p,(qi,q∗−i))|
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗i )
]
.
Finally, we have
∑
j 6=i
∂ι(qi, q
∗
j )
∂qi
(q∗i )(1− δ · ι(qi, qj))−1 →
∑
j 6=i
∂ι(qi, q
∗
j )
∂qi
(q∗i )
because lim sup δι(q, q)n < 1.
Given t ∈ PTi(p∗,q∗), let τ(t) be the smallest number of (direct or indirect) links such
that firm i would still know all technologies j ∈ t with only τ(t) of its links.
We next prove Lemma 2, which states that along any sequence of symmetric investment
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equilibria with lim sup δι(q∗, q∗)n < 1,
δι(q∗, q∗)n ∼ Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)]
for all i.
As above, each technology t ∈ PTi(p∗,q∗) under a given realization of all random vari-
ables is chosen with probability proportional to the probability of that realization.
Lemma 2. Along any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria with lim sup δι(q∗, q∗)n <
1,
δι(q∗, q∗)n ∼ Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)]
for all i.
Proof of Lemma 2. We will apply Lemma A2, which gives
δ · ∂ι(qi, q
∗)
∂qi
(q∗) · E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
∼ 1
n
∂E
[(|Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))|
k−1
)]
∂qi
(q∗)
at a symmetric equilibrium.
Let Γ be the set of weakly increasing tuples γ = (γ1, . . . , γτ ) of integers such that∑τ
j=1 γj = k − 1. We will write l(γ) for the length of the tuple γ.
Let Xj be i.i.d. random variables with distribution given by the number of ideas that firm
i would learn from a firm j′ conditional on learning directly from j′. That is, Xj is distributed
as the sum of a Bernoulli random variable with success probability p∗ (corresponding to
direct learning) and a random variable distributed as |Ij′(p∗,q∗)| with probability δ and
zero otherwise.
Then we claim that
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
=
∑
γ∈Γ
(
n− 1
l(γ)
)
ι(q∗, q∗)l(γ)E
l(γ)∏
j=1
(
Xj
γj
)+ o(1). (3)
The right-hand side counts the expected number of choices of k−1 ideas learned (directly or
indirectly) via different neighbors j, allowing for the same idea to be chosen multiple times
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via distinct neighbors. To show the claim, we must argue that the contribution from choices
of k − 1 ideas including such repetitions is o(1).
We first bound the probability that there exists a firm j such that there are two paths
from i to j with distinct first edges. Given j′, j′′ ∈ Ni, we want to bound the probability
there is a j in the intersection
Ij′(p
∗,q∗) ∩ Ij′′(p∗,q∗)
above. The expected number of firms with a path to j′ in the indirect learning network is at
most 1
1−ι(q∗,q∗)nδ , and the same holds for j
′′. Therefore, each learns from at most 1+ι(q
∗,q∗)n
1−ι(q∗,q∗)nδ
firms. By independence, the probability of an intersection is thus at most 1
n
( (1+ι(q
∗,q∗))2
1−ι(q∗,q∗)nδ )
2.
Because ι(q∗, q∗)δn is bounded away from one above and δ is finite, this implies that the
probability there is a firm j observed via any such j′ and j′′ is bounded above by O( 1
n
).
By Lemma A1, the probability that |Ii(p∗,q∗)| = y decays exponentially in y. Since(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k−1
)
is polynomial in |Ii(p∗,q∗)|, it follows that the contribution to the expectation
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k−1
)]
from any O( 1
n
)-probability event is o(1). This completes the proof of the claim
in equation (3).
We can express the right-hand side of Lemma A2 similarly. Recall the right-hand side
counts the number of additional sets of k − 1 distinct ideas that would be known to i if i
added a direct link to an additional random agent. We then have:
1
n
E
[
∂
(Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗)
]
=
∑
γ∈Γ
(
n− 2
l(γ)− 1
)
ι(q∗, q∗)l(γ)−1E
l(γ)∏
j=1
(
Xj
γj
)+ o(1).
The same argument shows that the contribution from choices of k − 1 ideas at least one of
which is learned via multiple links is o(1).
Substituting into Lemma A2, we find that
ι(q∗, q∗)δ ∼ E
[(
n−2
l(γ)−1
)(
n−1
l(γ)
) ] ,
where the expectation is taken over all (k − 1)-element sets of ideas in Ii(p∗,q∗), and for
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each such set, l(γ) is the number of direct links on a path to at least one idea in the set.
Thus,
lim
n→∞
ι(q∗, q∗)δn = lim
n→∞
E[l(γ)] = lim
n→∞
Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)].
We must have τ(t) ≥ 1 for all t. So by Lemma 2, we have
lim inf
n
δι(q∗, q∗)n ≥ 1
at any subcritical sequence of symmetric investment equilibria. This contradicts the defini-
tion of a subcritical sequence of equilibria.
Supercritical Case: Suppose there exists a supercritical sequence of symmetric invest-
ment equilibria. We have lim inf ι(q∗, q∗)δn > 1 along this sequence, and we can pass to a
convergent subsequence under which lim ι(q∗, q∗)n exists.
Theorem 1 of Karp (1990) shows that a.a.s. the number of firms that all firms in the
giant component learn from is αn+ o(n) for a constant α increasing in lim q∗n and that the
number of agents outside the giant component observed by any agent is o(n).
We have
E
[(|Ii(p∗, (qi, q∗−i))|
k − 1
)]
= (p∗)k(1− (1− δι(qi, q∗))α(n−1)+o(n))((α(n− 1))k−1 + o(nk−1)).
In particular, to solve for firm i’s choice of qi to first order, we need only consider technolo-
gies consisting of i’s private idea and (k − 1) ideas learned by the giant component. The
probability that such a technology faces competition is
(1− δ · ι(qi, q∗)− (1− δ) · ι(qi, q∗) · α)n−1 + o(1).
The term δ · ι(qi, q∗) corresponds to the possibility of a firm j indirectly learning all of firm
i’s ideas. The term (1 − δ) · ι(qi, q∗) · α corresponds to the possibility of a firm j directly
learning firm i’s idea (but not indirectly learning from i) and indirectly learning the ideas
learned by the giant component.
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Thus, we are looking for qi maximizing:
E
[(|Ii(p∗, (qi, q∗−i))|
k − 1
)]
(1− δ · ι(qi, q∗)− (1− δ) · ι(qi, q∗) · α)n−1. (4)
We want to find qi maximizing expression (4) asymptotically. We claim the derivative of
expression (4) in qi is equal to zero at q
∗ only if ι(q∗, q∗)δn ≤ 1. A fortiori, we can instead
show this for
E
[(|Ii(p∗, (qi, q∗−i))|
k − 1
)]
(1− δ · ι(qi, q∗))n−1.
This is because for n large, the derivative of this expression in qi is positive if the derivative
of expression (4) is positive.
The first-order condition for the latter expression at qi = q
∗ implies that
(p∗)kn(α(n−1))k−1(1−δι(q∗, q∗))n−1(δα(1−δι(q∗, q∗))(1−δι(q∗, q∗))α(n−1)−1−(1−(1−δι(q∗, q∗))α(n−1))
is o(nk−1). Solving for ι(q∗, q∗) such that this holds, we obtain
lim
n
(1− δι(q∗, q∗))α(n−1)−1 = 1
1 + δα
.
Thus,
lim
n
e−δαι(q
∗,q∗)n =
1
1 + δα
. (5)
The left-hand side is the asymptotic probability that a firm does not indirectly learn from a
firm which learns all ideas known to all firms in the giant component, and this is 1− α. So
1− α = 1
1 + δα
,
or equivalently
α(α + 1− δ) = 0.
Thus, any sequence of solutions to equation (5) must have α = 0, and therefore cannot be
supercritical.
We have now shown that any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria is critical. We
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next prove that there exists a symmetric investment equilibrium for n large.
Existence: To check existence of a symmetric investment equilibrium, let BRi(q) be the
set of best responses qi for firm i when all other firms choose qj = q and pj = p > 0. Note
that the set BRi(q) does not depend on the value of p. Because payoffs are continuous in q,
the correspondence BRi(q) has closed graph.
We have shown that when ι(q, q) < 1
δn
, any element of BRi(q) is equal to the expectation
of τ(t) over proprietary technologies.19 Because τ(t) ≥ 1 for all t, when ι(q, q) < 1
δn
we have
ι(BRi(q), q) ⊂ [ 1
2δn
,
k
δn
]
for n sufficiently large.20
Suppose that ι(q, q) ≥ 1
2δn
. Then firm i can achieve a positive payoff by choosing qi
such that
∑
j 6=i ι(qi, q) = 1. On the other hand expected payoffs to firm i vanish along any
sequence of qi → 0. Therefore 0 is not in the closure of BRi(q) whenever ι(q, q) ≥ 12δn .
By compactness we can choose (n) such that
ι(BRi(q), q) ≥ (n)
δn
when 1
2δn
≤ ι(q, q). We therefore have
ι(BRi(q), q) ⊂ [(n)
δn
, 1] when ι(q, q) ∈ [(n)
δn
, 1]
for n sufficiently large. So by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, for n sufficiently large there
exists a fixed point of BRi(q) at which ι(q, q) ∈ [ (n)δn , 1].
Fix any fixed point q∗ of BRi(q). Let the potential proprietary technologies PPTi(q) be
the set of technologies t such that firm i will receive monopoly profits for t if all ideas in
the technology t are discovered. This is a random object depending on the realizations of
interactions but not on the realizations of private investment, and PPTi(q)∩ I = PTi(p,q).
We have shown that q∗ is critical, so E[|PPTi(q)|]→∞.
19We stated this result above at equilibrium, but only used that firm i was choosing a best response.
20Indeed, by the lemma we could take any open interval containing [ 1δn ,
k−1
δn ] instead of [
1
2δn ,
k
δn ].
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A symmetric equilibrium corresponds to p∗ satisfying
p∗ = argmaxppi(p
∗)k−1E[|PPTi(q)|]− c(p).
Taking the first-order condition, a symmetric equilibrium corresponds to p∗ satisfying
c′(p∗) = (p∗)k−1E[|PPTi(q)|].
Because c(·) is continuously differentiable and convex with c′(0) ≥ 0 and c(p)→∞ as p→ 1,
while E[|PPTi(q)|] → ∞, there exists a solution for n sufficiently large. So there exists a
symmetric investment equilibrium for n sufficiently large.
A.2 Arbitrary Investment Equilibria
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to extend our characterization to arbitrary
equilibria. It is again sufficient to show that we cannot have a supercritical sequence of
investment equilibria or a subcritical sequence of investment equilibria, and we treat each
case separately.
We first consider the supercritical case, and show that there exists a giant component with
the same relevant properties as in our analysis of symmetric equilibria. We then consider the
subcritical, which follows the same basic outline as in our analysis of symmetric equilibria.
Supercritical Case: Because the sequence of actions is supercritical, we can assume
that the matrix (ι(qi, qj)δ)ij has spectral radius at most λ > 1 for all n sufficiently large.
We first claim that there exists α > 0 such that for all n, there is a component of
the learning network containing at least αn firms a.a.s. It is sufficient to show this after
decreasing qi for some i, and therefore also λ. So we can assume without loss of generality
that there are at most K choices of qi for each n. Here the number of distinct actions K can
depend on the initial upper bound λ. We denote the number of firms choosing qi by n(qi).
By Theorem 1 of Bloznelis, Go¨tze, and Jaworski (2012), the largest component has at
least αn+o(n) nodes a.a.s., where α is the extinction probability of the multi-type branching
process with types corresponding to choices of qi and the number of successors of type qi′
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of a node of type qi distributed as a Poisson random variable with mean δι(qi, qi′)n(qi′). By
Theorem 2 of Section V.3 of Athreya and Ney (1972), this extinction probability α > 0 for
n large since λ > λ > 1. This proves the claim, and we now return to studying the original
actions q.
Each firm can choose qi such that the expected number of learning opportunities is equal
to 1. Because the probability other firms learn the ideas in the giant component is increasing
in their actions qj, the probability of learning all ideas learned by the component of αn firms
when such a component exists is at least 1/e. So firm payoffs under this choice of qi are
of order nk−1. Because the probability of a firm indirectly learning from a firm i grows
exponentially in qi, it follows that we can choose C such that q is at most
C√
n
for all n.
Because there is a component of the learning network containing at least αn firms with
probability at least , we can also choose C such that q is at most C√
n
for all n. To see this,
note that the payoffs to choosing qi =
1√
n
are of order nk−1. On the other hand, the payoffs
to choosing qi =
C√
n
are bounded above by (1− e−CC)nk−1. So for C sufficiently small, the
expected payoffs to choosing qi =
C√
n
conditional on any realization of all links between firms
other than i are less than the expected payoffs to choosing qi =
1√
n
at equilibrium.
As n grows large, the probability that i ∈ t for a uniformly chosen t ∈ PTi(qi, q−i)
approaches zero. Similarly the probability that i ∈ t for a uniformly chosen t ∈ PTi(qi, q−i)
approaches zero. We will show that for any sequence of best responses qi for firm i, the
expected number of interactions ∑
j 6=i
ι(q∗i , q
∗
j )
has a unique limit.
To show this, we next claim that there is at most one component of linear size a.a.s. To
do so, we will use equation (5) of Bloznelis, Go¨tze, and Jaworski (2012). In the notation of
Bloznelis, Go¨tze, and Jaworski (2012), the type space S will be S = [C,C], and the kernel
κ(s, s′) = ss′. We will identify the type of an agent i with qi
√
n.
The space of distributions ∆(S) over types is compact. Fix such a distribution. Rela-
belling so that qi are increasing in i, we can generate a random network for each n by taking
the action qi of agent i will be s/
√
n, where s is the ith quantile of the distribution. As
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n→∞, by equation (5) of Bloznelis, Go¨tze, and Jaworski (2012), the largest component of
the learning network learns αn + o(n) ideas for some α ∈ [0, 1]. It follows from Theorem 1
and the same approximation techniques used in that paper that the second largest compo-
nent learns o(n) ideas. Because the space of distributions ∆(S) is compact, this convergence
of component sizes is uniform. So passing to a convergent subsequence if necessary, we can
assume that there is a unique giant component learning αn+ o(n) ideas a.a.s., where α > 0.
The payoffs to choosing qi are then equal to
(p∗)k
(
αn
k − 1
)
times the probability that firm i learns all ideas known to the giant component and no firm
j learns i’s idea and all ideas known to the giant component, plus a term of order o(nk−1).
Formally, if G1 is the set of firms that learn all ideas known to the giant component, the
action qi is chosen to maximize:
(
αn
k − 1
)(
1−
∏
j∈G1
(1− δι(qi, q∗j ))
) ∏
j∈G1
(1− ι(qi, q∗j ))
∏
j /∈G1
(1− δι(qi, q∗j )) + o(nk−1).
Taking the first-order condition, we must have:
δ
∑
j∈G1
q∗j ∼
(
1−
∏
j∈G1
(1− ι(qi, q∗j ))
)
(
∑
j∈G1
q∗j + δ
∑
j /∈G1
q∗j ).
Since the right-hand side is increasing in qi, the solution has a unique limit
lim
n
∑
j 6=i
ι(q∗i , q
∗
j ).
This limit does not depend on i. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume the
limit
lim
n→∞
∑
j
ι(qi, q
∗
j )
exists and is independent of i. Moreover, this limit must be greater than 1
δ
for equilibrium
to be supercritical.
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But then the same calculation as in the symmetric case shows that the best response qi
for all firms is at most δ√
n
asymptotically, which gives a contradiction.
Subcritical Case: The largest component of the learning network has at most o(n)
nodes a.a.s. We will derive an asymmetric version of the characterization in Lemma 2.
By the same argument given in Case 1, we can choose C such that q is at most C√
n
for
all n. We now proceed to derive a characterization of equilibrium as in Lemma 2. We will
then use this characterization to show the result.
We first claim, as in the proof of Lemma 2, that the contribution to
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
from ideas that are learned via multiple direct connections is lower order.
The key to the claim is the following lemma, which generalizes Lemma A1 from the
symmetric case:
Lemma A3. Consider a subcritical sequence of actions such that ι(qi, qi)n is bounded above
uniformly. Then
lim
n→∞
P[|Ii(p∗,q∗)| = y]
decreases at an exponential rate in y.
Proof. Because the sequence of actions is subcritical, we can assume that the matrix (ι(qi, qj)δ)ij
has spectral radius at most λ < 1 for all n sufficiently large. Increasing qi for some i and
therefore also λ, we can assume without loss of generality that there are at most K choices
of qi for each n. Here the number of distinct actions K can depend on the initial upper
bound λ. We denote the number of firms choosing qi by n(qi).
We will bound the number of firms j with a path from j to i in the indirect learning
network above by the number of nodes in a multi-type branching process with the number
of successors distributed as Poisson random variables. The types will correspond to the (at
most K) choices of qi.
For each firm i, the number of firms choosing qj that firm i learns from indirectly is
a binomial random variable with success probability δι(qi, qj) and at mos n(qj) trials. We
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showed in the proof of Lemma A1 that such a random variable is first-order stochastically
dominated by a Poisson random variable with parameter δι(qi, qj)n(qj).
Therefore, the number of firms that firms j with a path from j to i in the indirect
learning network is first-order stochastically dominated by the number of nodes in the multi-
type branching process such that the number of successors of a node of type qi of each type
qj is distributed as a a Poisson random variable with mean δι(qi, qj)n(qj). Call this number
of nodes y′.
We want to show that y′ <∞ with probability one and the probability that y′ = y decays
exponentially in y. The (at most K ×K) matrix δι(qi, qj)n(qj) has spectral radius at most
λ because (ι(qi, qj)δ)ij does. Therefore, by Theorem 2 of Section V.3 of Athreya and Ney
(1972), the probability that y′ =∞ is zero.
Let Zj be the number of nodes in the j
th generation of the branching process. By Theorem
1 of Section V.3 of Athreya and Ney (1972), the probability that Zj > 0 decays is of order
at most λ
i
. So the probability that ZT > 0 decays exponentially in T .
Dropping nodes with zero probability of interaction if necessary, we can ssume that all
qi > 0. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, there exists an eigenvector of (δι(qi, qj))ij with
positive real entries and eigenvalue equal to the spectral radius of this matrix. We call this
eigenvector v.
We claim that the probability that there are more than Tvi nodes of some type qi in
one of the generations 1, . . . , T decays exponentially in T . There is one node in generation
zero. Suppose that there are at most Tvi nodes of each type qi in generation j. Then by
our construction of v, the number of nodes of each type qi in generation j + 1 is Poisson
with mean at most Tviλ. A Poisson random variable of mean Tviλ is the sum of T Poisson
random variables of mean viλ. So by the central limit theorem, the probability that there
are at least Tvi such nodes decays exponentially in T , independent of j. This implies the
claim.
We have completed the proof that y′ <∞ with probability one and the probability that
y′ = y decays exponentially in y. Finally, |Ii(p∗,q∗)| is first-order stochastically dominated
by the sum of y′ Bernoulli random variables with n trials and success probability maxi ι(qi, qi).
The statement of the lemma now follows by the central limit theorem.
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We can now complete the proof of the claim that the contribution to
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
from ideas that are learned via multiple direct connections is lower order. This is because
the probability that there are links from j to i in the indirect learning network for l firms
j decays exponentially in l. On the other hand, the probability of learning the ideas in
a component multiple times converges to zero because each component is o(n) a.a.s. By
Lemma A3, the contribution from the complementary vanishing probability event vanishes
asymptotically. This gives the claim.
We now let Xj be i.i.d. random variables with distribution given by the number of
ideas that firm i would learn from a firm j conditional on learning directly from j. That
is, Xj is distributed as the sum of a Bernoulli random variable with success probability p
∗
j
(corresponding to direct learning) and a random variable with the distribution of |Ij(p∗,q∗)|
with probability δ and equal to zero otherwise.
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
=
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
l(γ)∏
r=1
q∗i q
∗
jrE
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
)+ o(E [(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
).
The second summation is over choices of l(γ) of distinct firms other than i.
1
n
E
[
∂
(Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗)
]
=
1
n
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
 l(γ)∑
r=1
q∗jr
∏
r′ 6=r
q∗i q
∗
jr
E
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
)+o(E [(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
.
By Lemma A2, we have
δ(
∑
j 6=i
q∗j )
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
l(γ)∏
r=1
q∗i q
∗
jrE
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
) ∼∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
 l(γ)∑
r=1
q∗jr
∏
r′ 6=r
q∗i q
∗
jr
E
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
) .
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Rearranging,
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
l(γ)∏
r=1
q∗i q
∗
jrE
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
) (δq∗i (∑
j 6=i
q∗j )− l(γ)) ∼ 0.
In particular, we have
δq∗i (
∑
j 6=i
q∗j ) ∼ Et∼Gi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)] (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the appropriate distribution Gi(p
∗,q∗) over
technologies.
As in the symmetric case above, this implies that lim infn→∞ δq∗i (
∑
j 6=i q
∗
j ) ≥ 1 for each
i. So the limit inferior of the row sums of (δι(q∗i , q
∗
j ))i,j is at least one. Thus the spectral
radius of this matrix also satisfies
lim sup
n
λ ≥ 1,
which contradicts our assumption that the sequence of equilibria is subcritical.
We conclude that any sequence of investment equilibria must be critical, which proves
Theorem 1.
B Remaining Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1. By Theorem 1, each firm learns o(n) ideas at the equilibrium (p∗,q∗).
Therefore, Ui(p
∗,q∗) is o(nk−1).
The spectral radius λ → 1 at a sequence of investment eqiulibria by Theorem 1. Let λ′
be the spectral radius under actions (p∗, (1 + )q∗) for each n.
Let  > 0. Because the first partial derivative of ι(·, ·) is a strictly positive and continuous
function on a compact set, we can bound the first partial derivative of ι(·, ·) above and away
from zero from below. it follows that we can choose 0 <  <  such that
1 +  < λ′ < 1 + 
for n sufficiently large.
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Therefore, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, when actions are (p∗, (1 + )q∗), there
is a giant component of firms learning at least αn ideas for some α > 0. The payoffs to
firm i from the event that i learns all ideas known to the giant component and no other
firm learns from i grows at rate proportional to nk−1. Firm i can ensure this event has
non-vanishing probability, for example by setting qi =
1√
n
. So at any sequence of equilibria
with non-vanishing investment, expected profits
Ui(p
∗, (1 + )q∗)
must grow at rate proportional to nk−1. The result follows from comparing the two growth
rates.
Proof of Corollary 2. Recall the potential proprietary technologies PPTi(q) are the set of
technologies t such that firm i will receive monopoly profits for t if all ideas in the technology
t are discovered. This is a random object depending on the realizations of interactions but
not on the realizations of private investment, and PPTi(q) ∩ I = PTi(p,q).
Given actions (p,q)
Ui(p,q) = E[
∑
t∈PPTi(q)
∏
j∈t
pj]− c(pi).
Because E[|PPTi(q∗)|], the first-order condition in pi implies that we must have p∗i .
Along a sequence of equilibria with non-vanishing investment, we must have p∗ → 1 since
E[|PPTi(q∗)|]→∞. Therefore,
∂Ui(p
∗ + x1,q∗)
∂x
(0) ∼ kE[|PPTi(q∗)|]− c′(p∗i ).
By the first-order condition for pi,
E[|PPTi(q∗)|] ∼ c′(p∗i ).
53
Combining these approximate equalities, it follows that
∂Ui(p
∗ + x1,q∗)
∂x
(0) ∼ (k − 1)E[|PPTi(q∗)|]
The same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 1 show that E[|PPTi(q∗)|] is o(nk−1)
while E[|PPTi((1 + )q∗)|] is a polynomial of order nk−1.
Hence we also have
E[|PPTi((1 + )q∗)|] > E[|PPTi(q∗)|] ∼ c′(p∗)
for n large, so
∂Ui(p + x1, (1 + )q
∗)
∂x
(0) > (k − 1)E[|PPTi((1 + )q∗)|]
for n large.
The corollary follows from the growth rates of E[|PPTi(q∗)|] and E[|PPTi((1+)q∗)|].
Proof of Proposition 1. Let b(n) be the share of public innovators for each n.
We first show that
lim inf
n
Ui(p
∗,q∗)(
n−1
k−1
) > 0
for all i at any investment equilibrium.
It is weakly dominant and strictly preferred at any investment equilibrium for all public
innovators to choose qi = 1. Therefore, all public innovators are in the same component
of the learning network. Private investment pi by public innovators is non-vanishing, so
asymptotically almost surely all firms in this component learn at least αn ideas for some
α > 0.
Let q and q be the maximum and minimum levels of openness q∗i chosen by private
firms, respectively. Because the probability that no firm learns indirectly from i vanishes
exponentially in ι(q∗i , 1)n while payoffs are O(n
k−1), the quantity ι(q, 1)n must be bounded
at equilibrium.
Therefore, a.a.s. a given firm i’s links are all with public innovators. Since learning
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indirectly from a public innovator implies learning at least αn ideas, it follows that ι(q, 1)n
does not vanish asymptotically. Therefore, the expected payoff Ui(p
∗,q∗) has order nk−1 for
each firm i. This proves the characterization of investment equilibria.
It remains to show there exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria with non-vanishing
investment. Recall that we now call an equilibrium symmetric if all public innovators choose
the same action and the same holds for all private firms.
Suppose that all public innovators choose pi ≥ 12 and qi = 1 and all firms other than i
choose (p, q) with p ≥ 1
2
and δqn ≤ 1. If qi is the best response for i, then limn qin exists
and is independent of (p,q). This is because the probability of interactions between i and
other firms vanishes asymptotically, while the best response does not depend on the number
of ideas learned by the unique giant component.
Therefore, we can choose  > 0 such that if q ∈ [ 
δn
, 1
δn
], then for n large so is any best
response qi for firm i. We claim that for n large, given p, there exists q that is a best response
to (p,q). This follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem as in the proof of Theorem 1.
We call this choice of openness q(p).
Given such (p,q), each firm has a non-vanishing probability of learning a linear number
of ideas. Therefore, E[|Ii(p,q)|]→∞. So any best response pi for each public innovator and
each firm i has pi ≥ 12 . By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, there exist symmetric actions
(p,q(p)) such that pi is also a best response for each i. Thus there exists a sequence of
symmetric equilibria with non-vanishing investment.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first characterize equilibria by showing we cannot have a supercrit-
ical and then subcritical sequence of investment equilibria. We then show there exists an
investment equilibrium for n large.
Supercritical Case: Suppose there is a supercritical sequence of investment equilibria
with choices β∗i of secrecy.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that all firms in the giant component
learn α˜n+ o(n) ideas for some α˜ and that the number of firms learning all ideas learned by
the giant component is αn+ o(n) for some α.21 The argument is the same as in the proof of
Theorem 1.
21Because link probabilities are no longer symmetric within pairs, we do not assume that α = α˜.
55
For each i, let αi be the probability that firm i learns all ideas learned by all firms in the
giant component. Finally, we let
β
∗
=
∑
j β
∗
j q
∗
j∑
j q
∗
j
.
As n→∞, this converges to the derivative of the number of firms that learn from firm i in
qi divided by
∑
j 6=i q
∗
j .
The first-order condition for firm i then implies:
δαiβ
∗ ≤ (1− αi)β∗i α + o(1). (7)
Suppose we increase qi/
∑
j 6=i q
∗
j infinitessimally. We can condition on the event that no firm
has learned indirectly from i. The left-hand side is the probability that a firm i has learned
indirectly from the giant component times the probability that a firm learns indirectly from
i after this increase. The right-hand side is the probability that firm i has not learned
indirectly from the giant component times the probability that firm i learns indirectly from
the giant component after this increase.
We have αi = 1− e−αβ∗i δ
∑
j 6=i ι(q
∗
i ,q
∗
j ). Substituting into equation (7),
(1− e−αβ∗i δ
∑
j 6=i ι(q
∗
i ,q
∗
j ))β
∗ ≤ e−αβ∗i δ
∑
j 6=i ι(q
∗
i ,q
∗
j )β∗i α + o(1).
Therefore,
δ
∑
j 6=i
ι(q∗i , q
∗
j ) ≤
log(1 + αβi
∗/β
∗
)
αβ∗i
+ o(1).
We claim the limit superior of the right-hand side as n → ∞ is at most one. Since βi ≤ 1,
this will contradict our assumption that equilibrium is supercritical.
We have β
∗ ≤ 1 since β∗j ≤ 1 for all j, so it is sufficient to show that
log(1 + αβ∗i )
αβ∗i
< 1.
This is a special case of the general elementary property x > log(1 + x) for x > 0.
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Therefore, we have
δβ∗i
∑
j 6=i
ι(q∗i , q
∗
j ) < 1
for n sufficiently large. Since this holds for all i, the spectral radius of the matrix (δβ∗i ι(q
∗
i , q
∗
j ))i,j
of indirect learning probabilities is less than one for all n sufficiently large. This contradicts
our assumption that the sequence of equilibria is supercritical.
Subcritical Case: Suppose there is a subcritical sequence of investment equilibria.
Introducing choices of secrecy, Lemma A2 states that
δ(
∑
j 6=i
q∗jβj)E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
=
1
n
E
[
∂
(Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗)
]
+ o(E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
).
We now let Xj be i.i.d. random variables with distribution given by the number of
ideas that firm i would learn from a firm j conditional on learning directly from j. That
is, Xj is distributed as the sum of a Bernoulli random variable with success probability p
∗
j
(corresponding to direct learning) and a random variable with the distribution of |Ij(p∗,q∗)|
with probability δ and equal to zero otherwise.
By the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we have:
E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
=
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
l(γ)∏
r=1
βiq
∗
i q
∗
jrE
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
)+ o(E [(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
).
and also
1
n
E
[
∂
(Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗)
]
=
1
n
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
 l(γ)∑
r=1
βiq
∗
jr
∏
r′ 6=r
βiq
∗
i q
∗
jr
E
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
)+o(E [(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
.
Therefore,
δ(
∑
j 6=i
q∗jβj)
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
l(γ)∏
r=1
q∗i q
∗
jrE
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
) ∼∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
 l(γ)∑
r=1
q∗jr
∏
r′ 6=r
q∗i q
∗
jr
E
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
) .
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Note that the βi terms cancel. Rearranging,
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
j1,...,jl(γ) 6=i
l(γ)∏
r=1
q∗i q
∗
jrE
l(γ)∏
r=1
(
Xjr
γr
) (δq∗i (∑
j 6=i
q∗jβj)− l(γ)) ∼ 0.
In particular, we have
δq∗i (
∑
j 6=i
q∗jβj) ∼ Et∼Gi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the appropriate distribution Gi(p
∗,q∗) over
technologies. Because τ(t) ≥ 1 for all t, the limit superior of the expected number of firms
that learn from i is at least one. This contradicts our assumption that the sequence of
equilibria is subcritical.
Existence: We will show there exists an investment equilibrium for n large. To do so,
we first fix p with
lim inf
n
min
i
pi > 0
for all i. Given such a p, we consider the set of best responses BR(q−i) for firm i when
other firms choose actions (p−i, q−i). Note that unlike in the proof of Theorem 1, since the
equilibrium is no longer symmetric, the best response qi can depend on others’ levels of
private investment.
First suppose that a sequence of opponents’ actions (p−i, q−i) is subcritical.22 Our analysis
above showed that for n large, the best response BR(p−i, q−i, β−i) has
qi(
∑
j 6=i
qjβj) ∈ [ 1
2δn
,
k
δn
].
Next, suppose that along a sequence of opponents’ actions (p−i, q−i, β−i), the matrix of
link probabilities for firms other than i has spectral radius λ > 1
2
. Then firm i can achieve
a positive payoff by choosing qi and βi such that βi
∑
j 6=i ι(qi, q) = 1. On the other hand
expected payoffs to firm i vanish or are negative along any sequence of best-responses such
that βiqi → 0. Therefore 0 is not in the closure of BRi(q) whenever ι(q, q) ≥ 12δn .
Because 0 is not in the closure of BRi(q−i) for any q−i > 0, by compactness we can choose
22We extend our definition of criticality to the restriction of the random network to agents other than i.
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(n) such that
BRi(q−i) ≥ (n)√
n
when λ > 1
2
. We therefore have
BRi(q−i)(
∑
j 6=i
qjβj) ∈ [(n)
δn
, 1] when qj(
∑
j′ 6=j
qj′βj′) ∈ [(n)
δn
, 1] for all j 6= i
for n sufficiently large. So by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, for n sufficiently large there
exists a fixed point of q 7→ (BRi(q−i))i. We will call this fixed point q(p) to indicate the
dependence on p. It remains to show that there exists p such that pi is a best response
under actions (p,q(p)) for all i.
Suppose that pi ≥ 12 for all i and all n. Our analysis of the subcritical and supercritical
regions above extends immediately to this fixed point, as we did not rely on p being chosen
optimally. Therefore, the sequence of outcomes q(p) must be critical. In particular, expected
payoffs at (p,q(p) converge to ∞ for all such sequences of p.
The best response pi maximizes
piEt∈PPTi(q)[
∏
j∈t
j 6=i
pj]− c(pi)
and therefore satisfies
c′(pi) = Et∈PPTi(q)[
∏
j∈t
j 6=i
pj]. (8)
Beacuse c(pi) is strictly increasing and strictly convex with c
′(0) ≥ 0 and c(p) → ∞ as
p→ 1, there exists a solution.
Since pj ≥ 12 for all j, for n large the optimal pi ≥ 12 as well since the expected number
of potential proprietary technologies converges to infinity by equation (8). So by Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem, for n large there exists p ∈ [1
2
, 1]n such that pi is optimal under actions
(p,q). This is a symmetric investment equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show there is no sequence of supercritical symmetric invest-
ment equilibria for any ρ > 0. To do so, we consider firm i’s choice of qi in the supercritical
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region. As in the proof of Theorem 1,
E
[(|Ii(p∗, (qi, q∗−i))|
k − 1
)]
= (p∗)k(1− (1− δι(qi, q∗))α(n−1)+o(n))((α(n− 1))k−1 + o(nk−1)).
In particular, to solve for firm i’s choice of qi to first order, we need only consider tech-
nologies consisting of i’s private idea and (k− 1) ideas learned by the giant component. The
probability that such a technology faces competition is
(1− δ · ι(qi, q∗)− (1− δ) · ι(qi, q∗) · α)n−1 + o(1).
The term δ · ι(qi, q∗) corresponds to the possibility of a firm j indirectly learning all of firm
i’s ideas. The term (1 − δ) · ι(qi, q∗) · α corresponds to the possibility of a firm j directly
learning firm i’s idea (but not indirectly learning from i) and indirectly learning the ideas
learned by the giant component.
Thus, we are looking for qi maximizing:
E
[(|Ii(p∗, (qi, q∗−i))|
k − 1
)ρ]
(1− δ · ι(qi, q∗)− (1− δ) · ι(qi, q∗) · α)n−1.
This expression is equal to:
(
(p∗)k(1− (1− δι(qi, q∗))α(n−1)+o(n))((α(n− 1))k−1 + o(nk−1))
)ρ
(1−δ·ι(qi, q∗)−(1−δ)·ι(qi, q∗)·α)n−1.
Therefore, asymptotically the optimal qi will be a maximizer of:
(p∗)ρ(k−1)+1(1−δι(qi, q∗))α(n−1)+o(n))((α(n−1))k−1+o(nk−1))ρ(1−δ·ι(qi, q∗)−(1−δ)·ι(qi, q∗)·α)n−1.
The terms containing qi do not depend on ρ to first order. Therefore, the optimization
problem is the same as in Theorem 1, and the same argument shows there is no supercritical
sequence of symmetric investment equilibria.
It remains to define ρ suitably and show there is no subcritical sequence of symmetric
investment equilibria when for ρ ≥ ρ. We will choose ρ to satisfy the conditions in the
following lemma:
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Lemma B4. If k = 2 and ρ ≥ 1, then ( y
k−1
)ρ
is convex in y > 0. If k > 2, there exists ρ < 1
such that
(
y
k−1
)ρ
is convex in y > 0 for all ρ ≥ ρ.
Proof. We can assume y ≥ k − 1. We want to determine the sign of:
d2
dy2
(
y
k − 1
)ρ
=
d2
dy2
((∏k−2
j=0(y − j)
(k − 1)!
)ρ)
.
This has the same sign as
d
dy
ρ(k−2∏
j=0
(y − j)
)ρ−1 k−2∑
i=0
∏
j 6=i
(y − j)
 .
This derivative is equal to
ρ(ρ− 1)
(
k−2∏
j=0
(y − j)
)ρ−2(k−2∑
i=0
∏
j 6=i
(y − j)
)2
+ ρ
(
k−2∏
j=0
(y − j)
)ρ−1 k−2∑
i=0
∑
i′ 6=i
∏
j 6=i,i′
(y − j). (9)
If ρ ≥ 1, both the first and second term are non-negative for y ≥ k − 1, so expression (9) is
non-negative as well.
Suppose k > 2. Expression (9) has the same sign as
(ρ− 1)
(
k−2∑
i=0
∏
j 6=i
(y − j)
)2
+
(
k−2∏
j=0
(y − j)
)
k−2∑
i=0
∑
i′ 6=i
∏
j 6=i,i′
(y − j). (10)
s The first term may be negative if ρ < 1, while the second term is positive for y ≥ k − 1.
Both are polynomials of degree 2k−2 in y. Therefore, we can choose y and ρ < 1 sufficiently
close to 1 such that expression (10) is positive for ρ > ρ and y > y.
We want the expression to be positive for k− 1 ≤ y ≤ y. There are finitely many values,
and for each expression (10) is positive when ρ is sufficiently close to one or at least one.
Therefore, increasing ρ if needed, we find that expression (10) is positive for ρ > ρ and
y ≥ k − 1. This proves the lemma.
Let ρ ≥ ρ, where ρ = 1 when k = 2 and ρ is chosen as in Lemma B4 for k > 2.
Suppose there exists a sequence of symmetric investment equilibria with lim supn δ ·
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ι(q∗, q∗)n < 1. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that δ · ι(q∗, q∗)n
converges.
We claim that for n sufficiently large
δ
∂ι(qi, q
∗)
∂qi
(q∗) · E
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)ρ]
<
1
n− 1E
[
∂
(|Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗)|
k−1
)ρ
∂qi
(q∗)
]
(11)
for all i. Both sides of the inequality converge because δ · ι(q∗, q∗)n converges to a limit less
than one.
Let X1 be a random variable equal to |Ii(p,q)| with probability δ and 0 with probability
1− δ. Then the left-hand side of equation (11) is equal to
E
[(
X1
k − 1
)ρ]
asymptotically.
Let X2 be the random variable with distribution equal to the change in |
(|Ii(p,q)|
k−1
)| if firm
i learned from an additional firm j chosen uniformly at random. Then the right-hand side
of equation (11) is equal to
E
[(|Ii(q,q)|+X2
k − 1
)ρ
−
(|Ii(q,q)
k − 1
)ρ]
asymptotically.
In this case, with probability 1 − δ, the firm i only learns directly from firm j. With
probability δ, firm i learns indirectly through firm j, and then learns
|Ij(p,q)| − |Ii(p,q) ∩ Ij(p,q)|
additional ideas.
The expected cardinality
|Ii(p,q) ∩ Ij(p,q)|
is o(1), by the same independence argument given in the proof of Lemma A2. Therefore, we
can ignore the intersection term in computing the limit of the right-hand side of equation (11).
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Let X˜2 be the random variable with distribution equal to the number of ideas firm i learns
from firm j, including any ideas firm i already knows, i.e. X2 without this intersection term.
Then X˜2 first-order stochastically dominates X1, and is one higher with non-vanishing
probability. By Lemma B4, this implies
E
[(
X1
k − 1
)ρ]
< E
[(|Ii(q,q)|+ X˜2
k − 1
)ρ
−
(|Ii(q,q)
k − 1
)ρ]
for n large. It follows that the same inequality holds with X2 replacing X˜2, which proves the
claim.
So along any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria with lim sup δι(q∗, q∗)n < 1,
for n sufficiently large
δι(q∗, q∗)n > Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)]
for all i. The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 2, with the approximate equality from
Lemma A2 replaced by the inequality from equation (11).
In particular, δι(q∗, q∗)n > 1 for n large, which contradicts the assumption of subcriti-
cality. So any sequence of symmetric investment equilibria is critical.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows the same basic outline as the proof of Proposi-
tion 2, with the function
(|Ii(p,q)|
k−1
)ρ
replaced by φ(|Ii(p,q)|).
We first show there is no sequence of supercritical symmetric equilibria with lim infn p
∗/n >
0. To do so, we consider firm i’s choice of qi in the supercritical region. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, the payoffs to firm i are:
E [Ui(p∗, (qi, q−i))] = (1−(1−ι(qi, q∗))α(n−1)+o(n))(1−ι(qi, q∗))n−1p∗φ
(
p∗(α(n− 1) + o(nk−1)))−c(p∗)
when the giant component has size αn+ o(n).
We will bound
φ(p∗(α(n− 1) + y)),
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where y is o(n). This expression is less than or equal to
φ(p∗α(n− 1)) + p∗yφ′(p∗(α(n− 1) + y)).
By the assumption of non-vanishing investment, we have limn p
∗ > 0. By our assumption
that
φ(xj)
φ(x′j)
→ 1 when xj/x′j → 1, we can conclude
φ(p∗(α(n− 1) + y)) = φ(p∗α(n− 1)) + o(φ(p∗α(n− 1))).
Therefore, qi is chosen to maximize:
(1− (1− ι(qi, q∗))α(n−1)+o(n))(1− ι(qi, q∗))n−1 + o(1).
The maximization is the same as in Theorem 1 with δ = 1, and the same calculation shows
there is no supercritical sequence of symmetric investment equilibria.
The proof that there is no the subcritical sequence of symmetric equilibria with lim infn p
∗/n >
0 is the same as in Proposition 2, with
(|Ii(p,q|
k−1
)ρ
replaced by φ(|Ii(p,q|). We no longer need
to prove Lemma B4, as we assume that φ(·) is convex.
Proof of Proposition 4. Proof of (i): We will use Lemma 3, which we now prove, to show we
cannot have a critical sequence of symmetric investment equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 3. We can assume without loss of generality that p is bounded away from
zero, because Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)] does not depend on the value of p as long as p is non-negative.
Let  > 0. The probability that firm i learns from d firms decays exponentially in d.
Because the number of possible proprietary technologies is bounded above by
(
n
k−1
)
, we can
choose d such that the contribution to Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)] from the event that firm i learns from
more than d other firms is at most  for n large.
Since  is arbitrary, we can restrict our analysis to the event that firm i learns from at
most d other firms.
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We claim that as n→∞, we have
E[|Ii(p,q)|]→∞.
Let λ > 0 and q(λ) is defined by ι(q(λ), q(λ)) = 1−λ
δn
. For any q < q′, the random variable
|Ii(p,q)| is first-order stochastically dominated by |Ii(p,q′)|. So it is sufficient to show that
lim
λ→0
lim
n→∞
E[|Ii(p,q)|]→∞.
We can bound |Ii(p,q)| below by the expected number of firms j with a path from j to
i in the indirect learning network. By Theorem 11.6.1 of Alon and Spencer (2004), the limit
of this quantity as n → ∞ is equal to the number of nodes in a Poisson branching process
with parameter 1 − λ. As λ → 0, this number of nodes converges to infinity. This proves
the claim.
The proof of Lemma 3 will also use the following lemma, which states that learning a
large number of ideas at a critical sequence of equilibria is rare for n large:
Lemma B5. Let ω(n)→∞. Then
P [|Ii(p,q)| > ω(n)]→ 0
as n→∞.
Proof. Let  > 0. We want to prove that
P [|Ii(p,q)| > ω(n)] < 
for n large.
Let q(λ) be the solution to ι(q(λ), q(λ)) = 1+λ
δn
. Once again, for any q < q′, the random
variable |Ii(p,q)| is first-order stochastically dominated by |Ii(p,q′)|. So it is sufficient to
show there exists λ > 0 such that
P [|Ii(p,q(λ))| > ω(n)] < 
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for n large.
We showed in the proof of Lemma 2 that the number of descendants of i in the indirect
learning network is first-order stochastically dominated by the Poisson branching process
with parameter 1+λ. The probability that this Poisson branching process includes infinitely
many nodes converges to 0 as λ → 0 (by equation 11.8 of Alon and Spencer, 2004), so we
can choose λ such that this probability is at most /2.
Given λ, we can also choose y such that the probability that the Poisson branching process
has y nodes for any y ≤ y <∞ is at most /4. Because |Ii(p,q)| is first-order stochastically
dominated by the sum of y Bernoulli random variables with success probability p and y
binomial random variables distributed as Binom(p(1+λ)
δn
, n − 1), we can choose y′ such that
the probability that
y′ ≤ |Ii(p,q)| <∞
is at most /2.
Then
P [|Ii(p,q)| > y′] < 
for n large, which implies
P [|Ii(p,q)| > ω(n)] < 
for n large since ω(n)→∞
Choose ω(n)→∞ such that
ω(n)
E[|Ii(p,q)|] → 0.
We have assumed that i learns from at most d other firms. We can order these firms from
1 to d. For each of these firms j, let the additional ideas AIj be the set of ideas that firm i
learns from firm j and has not learned from any previous firm 1, . . . , j − 1 in our ordering.
We claim that as n → ∞, a vanishing share of proprietary technologies include ideas
that firm i learns only from firms j with AIj ≤ ω(n). The number of such ideas is bounded
above by ω(n)d. So the number of proprietary technologies including at least one such idea
66
is bounded above by
E
[(|Ii(p,q)|+ dω(n)
k − 2
)
· (dω(n))
]
= dω(n)E
[(|Ii(p,q)|+ dω(n)
k − 2
)]
, (12)
while the total number of proprietary technologies is on the same order as
E
[(|Ii(p,q)|
k − 1
)]
≥ E
[(|Ii(p,q)|
k − 2
)]
E [|Ii(p,q)|]
k − 1 . (13)
Since
ω(n)
E[|Ii(p,q)|] → 0,
the quotient of expression (12) divided by expression (13) vanishes as n→∞.
Let  > 0. For n sufficiently large, Lemma B5 implies that the probability that AIj >
ω(n) is at most . We will show that the contribution to Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)] from the event that
AIj > ω(n) for more than one j can be taken to be small.
We condition on the event that AIj > ω(n) for at least one j. Then the probability that
AIj > ω(n) for at least one other j is bounded above by d, while the expected number of pro-
prietary technologies increases by a multiplicative factor of less than d
k−1
in this case. Since
 can be taken to be arbitrarily small, it follows that the contribution to Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)]
from the event that AIj > ω(n) for more than one j vanishes as n→∞.
The remaining technologies in PTi(p,q) consist of firm i’s private idea and k − 1 ideas
learned from a single firm j. We thus have τ(t) = 1 for each of the remaining technologies
t ∈ PTi(p,q). This shows that Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)]→ 1, which proves the lemma.
We claim that if lim infn p > 0 and
lim sup
n
ι(q, q)nδ ≤ 1,
then given symmetric actions (p,q),
∂Ui(p,q)
∂qi
(q) > 0
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for n sufficiently large. In words, given symmetric actions in the subcritical or critical
region, increasing qi would increase payoffs. We can assume without loss of generality that
p is bounded away from zero, because the sign of this derivative is independent of p.
Let Di(q) be the set of firms j such that there is a path from i to j in the indirect-learning
network. We claim that when lim supn ι(q, q)δn ≤ 1, a.a.s. a random technology t ∈ Ti(p,q)
is known by |Di(q)| other firms.
We can write ι(q, q)δn = 1 + λ, where lim supn λ ≤ 0. By the ‘No Middle Ground’
claim from p. 210-211 of Alon and Spencer (2004), the probability that a given node in
an undirected random network with link probability 1+λ
n
is contained in a component of
cardinality at least λn at most n−2k−1 for n large. A standard correspondence states that
the size of the component containing a given node in an undirected random graph first-
order stochastically dominates the number of nodes reachable by a path from that node in
a directed random graph with the same link probability (see for example  Luczak, 1990).
So the probability that a given idea is learned indirectly by more than λn firms is at most
n−2k−1 for n large. Thus, we can choose a constant such that the probability that any idea
is learned indirectly by more than λn firms is at most n−2k for n large. Since there are
(
n
k
)
potential technologies, it is without loss of generality to restrict to the event that no idea is
learned indirectly by more than λn ideas.
Now, choose t ∈ Ti(p,q) and let j ∈ Ti(p,q). The number of firms that learn idea j
from each firm that indirectly learns j is bounded above by a Poisson random variable with
parameter 1/δ (by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma A2). So we can assume
that at most Cλn firms learn the idea for some constant C > 0. For a firm j′ /∈ Di(q) to
know all ideas in t, that firm must learn j and directly learn i. Each of the Cλn firms that
learn j will directly learn i with probability at most 1
δn
, so the probability that any of these
firms directly learns i vanishes asymptotically. This proves the claim.
Thus, the payoff to firm i is
Ui(p,q) = E [f(|Di(q)|)|Ti(p,q)|]− c(pi) + o(E [|PTi(p,q)]).
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Thus,
∂Ui(p,q)
∂qi
(q) = E
[
∂f(|Di(q)|)|
∂qi
(q)|Ti(p,q)|
]
+E
[
∂|Ti(p,q)|
∂qi
(q)f(|Di(q)|)
]
+o(E [|PTi(p,q)]).
We claim this is equal to
E
[
∂f(|Di(q)|)|
∂qi
(q)
]
E [|Ti(p,q)|]+E
[
∂|Ti(p,q)|
∂qi
(q)
]
E [f(|Di(q)|)]+o(E [|PTi(p,q)]). (14)
The relevant random variables are independent conditional on the event that
Ii(p,q) ∩Di(q) = ∅
and this intersection remains empty after adding an additional incoming or outgoing link.
Because
lim sup
n
ι(q, q)nδ ≤ 1,
this occurs asymptotically almost surely. We must show the contributions to Ti(p,q) from
the vanishing probability event that this intersection is non-empty vanish as n → ∞. This
follows from the bounds on the probability of this event in the ‘No Middle Ground’ claim
from p. 210-211 of Alon and Spencer (2004), and the argument is the same as above.
Because f is non-negative with f(0) = 1 and f(1) > 0, we can choose  > 0 such that
− 1
qn
· E
[
∂f(|Di(q)|)|
∂qi
(q)
]
< E [f(|Di(q)|)]− 
for all n. Here, the left-hand side is equal to the decrease in f(|Di(q)| when an additional
firm learns from firm i, which is at most f(|Di(q)| and will be smaller with non-vanishing
probability.
At a subcritical sequence of actions, we have
lim sup
n
ι(q, q)δn ≤ lim inf
n
Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)].
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By the same argument used to prove Lemma 2, this implies that
E [|Ti(p,q)|] < 1
qn
· E
[
∂|Ti(p,q)|
∂qi
(q)
]
for all n sufficiently large. At a critical sequence of actions, Lemma 3 shows that
lim
n→∞
Et∈PTi(p,q)[τ(t)] = 1.
At a critical sequence of actions, it follows from the definition of τ(t) that
E [|Ti(p,q)|] ∼ 1
qn
· E
[
∂|Ti(p,q)|
∂qi
(q)
]
.
In either case, substituting into expression (14) we obtain:
∂Ui(p,q)
∂qi
(q) > 0
in the subcritical or critical region for n sufficiently large. This proves the claim, so any
sequence of symmetric investment equilibria is supercritical.
It remains to show there exists a symmetric investment equilibrium. We have shown that
for n sufficiently large, when all other firms choose qj = q with q ∈ [ 1δn , 1], the best response
for firm i is also in [ 1
δn
, 1]. As in the proof of Theorem 1, existence follows by Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem.
Proof of (ii): Suppose there exists a critical or supercritical sequence of symmetric in-
vestment equilibria. We claim that
∂Ui(p
∗,q∗)
∂qi
(q∗) < 0,
which will give a contradiction. We can again assume without loss of generality that p is
bounded away from zero, because the sign of this derivative is independent of p.
First suppose there exists a critical sequence of investment equilibria. Lemma 3 shows
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that
lim
n→∞
Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)] = 1.
As a consequence,
E
[(|Ii(p∗, (qi,q∗−i))|
k − 1
)]
∼ 1
qn
·
∂E
[(|Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))|
k−1
)]
∂qi
(q∗).
Therefore,
∂E
[|PTi(p∗, (qi,q∗−i))|]
∂qi
(q∗) ∼ 0.
On the other hand,
∂E
[|Ti(p∗, (qi,q∗−i))|]
∂qi
(q∗) > 0
for n large, and increasing qi weakly increases the number of firms f(m) who know each
technology. Since firm i receives negative profits from each t ∈ Ti(p∗, (qi,q∗−i)) that is not
proprietary, firm i’s profits are decreasing in qi at qi = q
∗.
We next suppose there exists a supercritical sequence of equilibria. The expected profits
from choosing qi are:
(p∗)k
(
αn
k − 1
)
(1− δι(qi, q∗))αnf(Et∈Ti(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))[m]) + o(nk−1),
where α is the share of ideas learned by all firms in the giant component and m is the number
of other firms who know all ideas in a technology t.
Conditional on the event that Et∈Ti(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))[m] > 0, increasing qi will weakly decrease
expected payoffs because increasing Et∈Ti(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))[m] and increasing |Ii(p∗, (qi, q∗−i))| both
weakly decrease payoffs. Moreover, this increase is strict, because the probability of learning
the ideas in the giant component is strictly higher under higher qi.
Suppose Et∈Ti(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))[m] = 0. We showed in the proof of Theorem 1 that when f(m) =
0 for all m > 0, the increase in expected payoffs from an additional incoming link is less than
the decrease in expected payoffs from an additional outgoing link. Since decreasing f(m) for
m > 0 does not change the effect of an additional incoming link but decreases the expected
payoffs from an additional outgoing link, it follows that increasing qi will weakly decrease
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expected payoffs conditional on Et∈Ti(p∗,(qi,q∗−i))[m] = 0.
Therefore, increasing qi will weakly decrease expected payoffs unconditionally, which gives
our contradiction. We have checked the critical and subcritical cases, so this completes the
proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i): Suppose there exists a sequence of investment equilibrium with
n→∞.
We first consider the first-order condition for qi(1). The expected payoff to firm i with a
patent when k = 2 and link costs are  is:
pip
∗q∗(0)qi(1)(1− b)(n− 1)− (qi(1)(q∗(0)(1− b) + q∗(1)b)(n− 1)− c(pi).
The first term now does not depend on whether other firms learn the ideas involved in the
technologies that firm i can produce. The second term is the expected link cost.
The expected payoff is linear in qi(1), so the coefficient of qi(1) must be non-negative at
any investment equilibrium. Therefore:
(p∗)2q∗(0)(1− b) ≥ (q∗(0)(1− b) + q∗(1)b).
If equality holds, then firms with patents are indifferent to all choices of interaction rates.
But then firms without patents would not choose positive interaction rates, which they must
at any investment equilibrium. So the inequality is strict.
Because payoffs are strictly increasing in qi(1) on [0, 1], we have q
∗(1) = 1. Thus the
inequality
(p∗)2q∗(0)(1− b) > (q∗(0)(1− b) + q∗(1)b)
implies that lim infn q
∗(0) is positive. But if all interaction rates are bounded below by
constants, the probability that a firm j without a patent receives monopoly profits from a
given technology t decays exponentially. Since firm j’s link costs are linear in n, firm j’s
expected payoff is negative. This cannot occur at equilibrium, so we have a contradiction.
(ii): It is weakly dominant for all firms to choose q∗(1) = 1, and is strictly optimal at
any investment equilibrium. So for any δ > 0, almost surely all firms with patents are in
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the same component of the indirect-learning network. All firms in this component learn αn
ideas for some α > 0.
Suppose that q∗(0)n→∞ and consider firm i without a patent. The probability that no
firm with a patent learns indirectly from firm i decays exponentially in q∗(0)n, and so profits
must be o(nk−1). But firm i could receive higher profits by deviating to choose qi(0) = 1δn ,
as this would give profits of order nk−1. So it must be the case that q∗(0) is O(1/n), and
thus
ι(q∗(0), q∗(0)) = (q∗(0))2 = O(1/n2).
C Direct Learning
We now analyze the baseline model from Section 2 in the case δ = 0. Then firms can only
learn directly from other firms, and not indirectly.
Proposition C1. When δ = 0, there exists a symmetric investment equilibrium for n large,
and at any sequence of symmetric equilibria
lim
n
ι(q∗, q∗)n
1
k = (k − 1) 1k .
Interaction rates are much higher than in the indirect-learning case, because without
indirect learning much more interaction is needed for competition to be a substantial force.
The expected number of ideas learned by each firm is now O(n
k−1
k ), which is still asymptoti-
cally lower than in the supercritical case with indirect learning (where the expected number
of ideas learned is linear in n).
Proof. For n large, the expected number of potential technologies that firm i produces and
which include firm i’s private idea:
|Ti((pi,p∗−i), (qi,q∗−i))| ∼
1
(k − 1)!(ι(qi, q
∗)(n− 1))k−1
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The probability that no other firm produces any such technology is:
(1− ι(qi, q∗)ι(q∗, q∗)k−1)n−1 + o(1).
So qi is chosen to maximize the number of potential proprietary technologies for i:
|PTi((pi,p∗−i), (qi,q∗−i))| ∼
1
(k − 1)!(ι(qi, q
∗)(n− 1))k−1(1− ι(qi, q∗)ι(q∗, q∗)k−1)n−1. (15)
The first-order condition is
(k−1)
(
∂ι(q, q∗)
∂q
(q∗)
)
(1− ι(qi, q∗)ι(q∗, q∗)k−1) ∼ (n−1)ι(qi, q∗)
(
∂ι(q, q∗)
∂q
(qi)
)
ι(q∗, q∗)k−1.
We claim that we must have ι(q∗, q∗) → 0 at any sequence of equilibria. Else, expected
payoffs would vanish asymptotically, but firms could achieve non-vanishing profits by choos-
ing any interaction rate proportional to 1
n
. Thus, the first-order condition implies
lim
n
(n− 1)ι(qi, q∗)ι(q∗, q∗)k−1 = k − 1.
At equilibrium, this implies
ι(q∗, q∗) ∼ (k − 1
n− 1)
1
k
as desired.
Interactions between firms j and j′ now only impose a negative externality on a third
firm i. The negative externality appears because these interactions can facilitate competition.
There is no longer a benefit to firm i, because learning between firms j and j′ cannot facilitate
indirect learning by firm i.
A consequence is that increasing all firms’ openness would decrease average profits:
Corollary C1. When δ = 0, at any symmetric investment equilibrium (p∗,q∗),
lim
n→∞
∂Ui(p
∗,q)
∂q
(q∗) < 0.
Proof. Firm i’s optimization problem over qi given symmetric strategies (p
∗
−i, q−i) by oppo-
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nents is equivalent to choosing an interaction rate ι(qi, q−i) with all other firms, given their
interaction rates ι(q−i, q−i) with each other.
By the envelope theorem, the derivative of Ui(p
∗,q) as we vary ι(qi, q−i) fixing ι(q−i, q−i)
is zero at q = q∗. We can see from equation (15) that the derivative of Ui(p∗,q) as we vary
ι(q−i, q−i) fixing ι(qi, q−i) is negative. Therefore, decreasing q symmetrically at equilibrium
reduces the payoffs Ui(p
∗,q).
The corollary shows that decreasing interaction rates will increase average profits. If
firms respond to the new interaction rates by adjusting private investment, the effect on
the innovation rate will be more ambiguous: there will be an increase in R&D but a given
discovery will be less likely to spread.
We can observe from the proof that adding a constant link cost  > 0 would not change the
result of Proposition C1. This contrasts with Proposition 5(i), where there is no investment
equilibrium for any positive . We next discuss direct learning with patent rights when k > 2.
C.1 Patents
Proposition 5 considers granting patent rights to some types of ideas when δ = 0 and
k = 2. We found that adverse selection interactions prevents the emergence of an investment
equilibrium.
We now extend the analysis to k > 2. There is now an investment equilibrium, but the
same adverse selection effect implies that firms with patents choose much lower levels of
openness than without patents.
Suppose that a fraction b ∈ (0, 1) of firms receive patents, as in Proposition 5. We
maintain the assumption that δ = 0.
Proposition C2. Suppose a fraction b ∈ (0, 1) of firms receive patents and δ = 0. For
k > 2, there exists a symmetric investment equilibrium for n large, and at any sequence of
symmetric equilibria
lim
n
q∗(0)n1/k =
(
(1− b)(k − 1)
b
)1/k
.
Proof. It is weakly dominant for patent rights choose q∗(1) = 1, and this action is the best
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response at equilibrium. We claim that at any symmetric investment equilibrium,
q∗(0)n→∞.
The probability that all ideas in a given technology t including i are known to another firm
is
(1− q∗(0)k)bn + o(1).
This converges to zero whenever q∗(0)n1/k → 0, so if q∗(0)n→ 0 then firm i could profitably
deviate to increase qi.
Therefore, by the law of large numbers, for a firm i without patents choosing pi and qi(0)
against equilibrium actions
Ii((pi,p
∗
−i), (qi,q
∗
−i))| ∼ p∗qiq∗(0)(1− b)n.
So the expected number of proprietary technologies for a firm without patents choosing pi
and qi(0) is:
E[|PTi((pi,p∗−i), (qi,q∗−i))|] ∼ pi(p∗)k−1(1− qi(0)q∗(0)k−1)bn
(
qiq
∗(0)(1− b)n
k − 1
)
.
Note that we use our explicit formula ι(qi, qj) = qiqj for the interaction rate here.
We can approximate the binomial coefficient with its highest-order term, so taking the
first-order condition and cancelling terms gives:
bnq∗(0)k−1(qiq∗(0)(1− b)n) ∼ (k − 1)(1− b)nq∗(0)(1− qi(0)q∗(0)k−1).
Taking qi = q
∗(0) and solving,
q∗(0) ∼
(
1− b
b
· k − 1
n
)1/k
as claimed above.
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As a result, the interaction rate between firms without patents is
ι(q∗(0), q∗(0)) ∼
(
1− b
b
· k − 1
n
)2/k
,
which is lower order than the interaction rate in Proposition C1. The payoffs to firms
without patents are therefore of lower order than in Proposition C1, where no patent rights
are granted.
The interaction rate between a firm with a patent and a firm without a patent is
ι(q∗(0), q∗(1)) ∼
(
1− b
b
· k − 1
n
)1/k
,
which is the same order as the interaction rate in Proposition C1. The payoffs to firms with
patents are therefore of the same order as in Proposition C1, where no patent rights are
granted.
D Firm Size
The baseline model assumed that each firm can discover a single idea. In this section, we
consider firms that can instead discover 1 < σ < k private ideas.23
A firm with size σ > 1 can frictionlessly share ideas internally without fear of competition.
Equivalently, we can interpret a firm of size σ > 1 as the entity created by a licensing
agreement between σ small firms.
More formally, we continue to let the set of firms be {1, . . . , n} but now allow multiple
ideas for each firm. Each of the σ ideas corresponding to firm i is discovered independently
with probability pi. A firm learning i directly from j will learn all private ideas discovered
by firm j. The analysis from Sections 3 and 5, including Theorem 1 and Propositions 2 and
4, extends easily to any firm size σ < k.
We will now compare the payoffs of firms of two different sizes σ and σ′. Suppose there
are fixed positive shares of firms of each size. We can think of the exercise as measuring the
23The assumption that σ < k rules out investment equilibria with no interaction: all firms choose qi = 0
but private investment pi > 0.
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value of increasing firm size.
Proposition D3. Assume f(m) ≥ 0 for all m. If firm i can discover σ ideas and firm i′
can discover σ′ ideas, then at any sequence of investment equilibria:
lim
n→∞
Ui(p
∗,q∗)
Ui′(p∗,q∗)
=
σ
σ′
.
The proposition says that when payoffs are such that equilibrium is critical or super-
critical, then small and large firms obtain the same payoffs per idea asymptotically. An
implication is that merging two separate firms would increase their profits by very little for
n large.
We can give intuition in the case σ = 1 and σ′ = 2. Two separate firms of size one can
each potentially produce technologies by combining their private idea with n−1 ideas learned
from others. A firm of size two can also potentially produce technologies by combining either
of its private ideas with n−1 ideas learned from others. In addition, the firm of size two can
produce technologies by combining both of its private ideas with n − 2 ideas learned from
others. These additional technologies generate any excess profits for the larger firm over
the two smaller firms. Because
(
y
k−1
)
is much larger than
(
y
k−2
)
for y large, the additional
technologies have a small impact on profits in large markets.
When equilibrium is subcritical (e.g. f(m) < 0 for all m > 0), we have
lim
n→∞
Ui(p
∗,q∗)
Ui′(p∗,q∗)
>
σ
σ′
.
In this case, because firm profits are bounded asymptotically, technologies using multiple
private ideas will generate a non-vanishing share of a firm’s profits.
An important assumption in Proposition D3 is that σ and σ′ does not depend on n, so
that firms are still small relative to the overall market. A firm that can discover a non-
vanishing fraction of all ideas can obtain much higher payoffs per idea than small firms, as
such a firm will obtain payoffs of order nk−1 even without interacting with other firms.
Proof of Proposition D3. Suppose that f(m) ≥ 0 for all m > 0, as in Sections 2 and 3. We
can then show that equilibrium is critical or supercritical by a modification of the argument
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used to prove Theorem 1 and Proposition 4, which we now describe.
A version of Lemma A2 still applies at any subcritical equilibrium. The statement and
proof must be modified, as in the proof of the subcritical asymmetric case of Theorem 1,
to accommodate heterogeneity in firms. Because σ < k, we must have τ(t) ≥ 1 for all t.
Because δq∗n is equal to the expectation of τ(t) with respect to a suitable distribution over
technologies t, we cannot have a subcritical equilibrium.
Therefore, we have
lim
n→∞
Ui(p
∗,q∗) =∞
for firms i of either size.
So for any integer y > 0 and any  > 0, we have
E
[|PTi(p∗,q∗)|1|Ii(p∗,q∗)|>y] ≥ (1− )E [|PTi(p∗,q∗)|]
for n sufficiently large, where 1 is the indicator function. That is, almost all of the profits
of firm i are generated in the event that firm i learns at least y ideas.
Because
lim
y→∞
(
y
k−l
)(
y
k−1
) = 0
for all l > 1, in expectation at least a share 1−  of technologies in PTi(p∗,q∗) include only
one private idea developed by firm i (of either size).
Suppose σ < σ′ and fix firms i of size σ and i′ of size σ′. The preceding facts imply that
by choosing (pi, qi) = (pi′ , qi′), for any  > 0 the firm i can guarantee
E
[|PTi((pi, p∗−i), (qi, q∗−i)|] ≥ (1− )3E [|PTi′(p∗,q∗)|]
for n sufficiently large. Here the first two factors of (1− ) correspond to the share of propri-
etary technologies including only one private idea developed by firm i′, while we introduce
the third because at least a share 1−  of proprietary technologies for firm i′ do not include
idea i. This implies the result.
This section introduced heterogeneity in firm size. Our results can similarly accommodate
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heterogeneity in other parameters, such as the complexity k of products produced by a firm
or the private investment cost c(·).
E Investment/Interaction Tradeoffs
Our main model focuses on a tradeoff between learning and secrecy. The same techniques
also let us characterize a related model in which firms instead face tradeoffs between learning
and investment, and must decide how to allocate resources between these two tasks. In
particular, we now model the probability that firm i learns from firm j as depending only
on firm i’s action rather than depending symmetrically on firm i and firm j’s actions.
A firm i continues to choose actions pi and qi, now subject to the budget constraint that
pi + λqin = 1
for some λ > 0. The constant λ determines the cost of an additional expected interaction in
terms of probability of discovering a private idea.
Firm i learns directly from each firm j with probability qi.
24 As in the main model, in
this case firm j learns indirectly through firm j with probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. All realizations
of links and private ideas remain independent.
We maintain the baseline payoff structure from Section 2. There is no longer an explicit
cost c(pi) to private investment. So
Ui(p,q) = E[|PTi(p,q)|],
where PTi(p,q) is the set of technologies for which firm i receives monopoly profits.
The equilibrium characterization depends on the rate at which the firm can substitute
between interaction and private investment:
Theorem E1. Suppose δ > 0. Any sequence of symmetric equilibria with positive payoffs
is:
24In particular, this learning rate no longer depends on qj .
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(i) Subcritical if λ < δ
2
;
(ii) Critical if λ = δ
2
; and
(iii) Supercritical if λ > δ
2
.
As the opportunity cost of interaction decreases, the equilibrium level q∗ increases. The
key intuition is that, as in the baseline model, the marginal downside to additional interaction
is proportional to the current profits. In the baseline model that downside comes from
interaction potentially facilitating competition, while now the downside comes from a lower
probability of discovering a private idea.
Exploiting the similar structure, we can derive a variant of Lemma 2:
λq∗n ∼ p∗Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)].
At the critical threshold, we have
δq∗n→ 1
and can show as in the proof of Proposition 4(ii) that Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)] → 1. The theorem
follows from these facts and the budget constraint.
One could also show as in the proof of Theorem 1 that there exists an equilibrium with
positive payoffs for n large. We omit the proof here.
Proof. We will show an analogue of Lemma A2 in this context.
We claim that along any sequence of symmetric equilibria with positive payoffs and
δqn < 1 for all n,
λE
[(|Ii(p∗,q∗)|
k − 1
)]
∼ p∗E
[
∂
(|Ii(p∗,(qi,q∗−i)|
k−1
)
∂qi
(q∗i )
]
(16)
for each i.
We can argue as in the proof of Lemma A2 that since δqn < 1, competition from indirect
learning is lower order. Therefore, we can condition on the event that no firm j has learned
indirectly from firm i, which is independent of |Ii(p∗,q∗)|.
The left-hand side of equation (16) is λ times the benefit from a marginal increase in
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private investment pi. The right-hand side of equation (16) is the benefit from a marginal
increase in qi. By the budget constraint
pi + λqin = 1,
these are equal at any interior equilibrium. Payoffs are zero at equilfibria with pi = 0 or
pi = 1 for any i.
It follows as in the proof of Lemma 2 that along any sequence of symmetric equilibria
with positive payoffs and δqn < 1 for all n,
λq∗n ∼ p∗Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)].
At any symmetric subcritical equilibrium we must have
Et∈PTi(p∗,q∗)[τ(t)] > 1.
So we must have
λq∗n < p∗
for n large. Substituting in the budget constraint, we conclude that λ < δ
2
.
Because
λqn < p∗Et∈PTi(p∗,q[τ(t)]
for q sufficiently small and n large, by continuity there exists a subcritical equilibrium when
λ < δ
2
.
Next, suppose δq∗n > 1. Then if α is the number of ideas learned by firms in the giant
component, the payoff to choosing qi is approximately proportional to:
(1− λqin)(1− e−δqiαn)(1− λq∗n)k−1
(
αn
k − 1
)
.
Indeed, this is the payoff if no firm learns i’s idea and all other ideas learned by the giant
component, and the probability this occurs is independent of the choice of qi.
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Taking the first-order condition, we have
λ(1− e−δq∗αn) ∼ δα(1− λq∗n)e−δq∗αn
or equivalently
λ
δ
∼ α(1− λq∗n) · e
−δq∗αn
1− e−δq∗αn .
Because α ∼ 1− e−δq∗αn, this implies
λ
δ
∼ (1− λ
δ
δq∗n)(1− α).
To have a solution with α > 0, and therefore to have a sequence of symmetric supercritical
equilibria, requires λ > δ
2
.
Since the derivative of the payoffs in qi are negative for a symmetric q with q large and
n large, by continuity there exists a symmetric supercritical equilibrium when λ > δ
2
.
Combining the two arguments above, any sequence of symmetric equilibria with positive
payoffs is critical.
F Public Innovators and Directed Interaction
We now show that the result of Proposition 1 continues to apply if firms can direct their
interactions toward private firms or public innovators.
As in Section 3.4, public innovator i pays investment cost c(pi) and receives a payoff of
one for each technology t such that: (1) i ∈ t and (2) j ∈ {i} ∪ Ii(p,q) for all j ∈ t. We will
rely on the fact that for public innovators there is no downside to interactions, but not on
the exact incentive structure.
All firms have the same incentives as in the baseline model. Public innovators and firms
can now choose two interaction rates qi0 and qi1, where qi0 is the interaction rate with public
innovators and qi1 is the interaction rate with private firms.
We show payoffs again grow at the same rate as in the supercritical region, up to a
constant factor:
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Proposition F4. Suppose a non-vanishing share of agents are public innovators. Then
there exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria with non-vanishing investment, and at any
sequence of equilibria with non-vanishing investment
lim inf
n
Ui(p
∗,q∗)(
n−1
k−1
) > 0
for all firms i.
Proof. Let b(n) be the share of public innovators for each n.
We first show that
lim inf
n
Ui(p
∗,q∗)(
n−1
k−1
) > 0
for all i at any investment equilibrium.
It is weakly dominant and strictly preferred at any investment equilibrium for public
innovators to choose q∗i0 = q
∗
i1 = 1. Therefore, all public innovators are in the same component
of the learning network. Private investment pi by public innovators is non-vanishing, so
asymptotically almost surely all firms in this component learn at least αn ideas for some
α > 0.
Each private firm can obtain expected payoffs O(nk−1) by choosing qi0 = 1 and qi1 = 0.
This is because then the probability that firm i learns indirectly from a public innovator and
no firm j learns from i is non-vanishing, and the payoffs from this event are O(nk−1). This
shows the desired bound on Ui(p
∗,q∗)
(n−1k−1)
.
It remains to show there exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria with non-vanishing
investment. Suppose that all public innovators choose p0 ≥ 12 and qi0 = qi1 = 1 and all firms
other than i choose (p1, q0, q1) with p1 ≥ 12 , δq0n ≤ 1 and q1 = 0. If qi0 is the best response
for i, then limn qi0n exists and is independent of p0 and (p1, q0, q1). This is because the
probability of interactions between i and other firms vanishes asymptotically, while the best
response does not depend on the number of ideas learned by the unique giant component.
Therefore, we can choose  > 0 such that if q0 ∈ [ δn , 1δn ], then so is firm i’s best response
qi0. Because all other private firms choose qj1 = 0, firm i is indifferent to all choices of qi1
and in particular qi1 = 0 is a best response. We claim that for n large, given p, there exists
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q such that each each qi is a best response to (p0, p1, q0, q1). This follows from Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem as in the proof of Theorem 1. We call this choices of openness q0(p0, p1).
Given such (p0, p1, q0(p0, p1)), each firm has a non-vanishing probability of learning a
linear number of ideas. Therefore, E[|Ii(p,q)|]→∞. So any best response pi for each public
innovator and each firm i has pi ≥ 12 . By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, there exists
(p0, p1, q0(p0, p1)) such that p0 ≥ 12 and p1 ≥ 12 are also best responses. Thus there exists a
sequence of equilibria with non-vanishing investment.
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